By far the newest development in the study of ethnic conflict and nationalism is the rise of postmodern approaches.¹ What distinguishes postmodernism from the mainstream social sciences is, minimally, a twofold claim that power relations are deeply implicated in the formation of knowledge and that much of what passes for objective or scientific knowledge in the human sciences is basically a "narrative" "constructed" by the knowledge elites and promoted by the institutions of power.² Alternative forms of knowledge were suppressed in history, for they were associated with premodern forms of knowing and patronized by those who had very little power in society.

Postmodern views have serious implications for research on postcolonial societies and "subaltern groups," such as women, tribals, peasants, and minorities. In effect, their principal substantive claim is that the existing knowledge about "the marginal peoples" was produced by those who were privileged enough to produce it: the colonial masters and the native elite. The subaltern groups were rarely "self-represented." As a result, the available historical knowledge about postcolonial societies and marginal peoples is so contaminated with misconceptions and condescension that it must be "deconstructed" or, more simply, reformulated.

The study of postcolonial societies has been profoundly influenced by these formulations. Among disciplines going through "the ferment" are "history, anthropology and literature."³ With the partial exception of political philosophy, political science has paid little attention to postmodernism.⁴ This silence is no longer sustainable. Much of the contemporary work on identities and ethnic conflict is inspired by postmodernism, and analyses of "representation," "narratives," "discourses," "contextualization," "essentialization," "problematization," and "deconstruction" are fast becoming an important mode of argumentation in conferences, seminars, and writings on ethnicity.⁵

This paper seeks to engage the postmodern literature on Hindu-Muslim conflict in India.⁶ Three arguments, combining Indian specificities with a postmodern intellectual sensibility, have so far been made.⁷ First, there is no "scientific knowledge"
about the origins, rise, and spread of Hindu-Muslim antagonisms; rather, there have only been “discourses” or “narratives.” In the hands of the British, a primordial antagonism between Hindus and Muslims dating back centuries became the “master narrative,” even though there was enough evidence of Hindu-Muslim coexistence. Primordial antagonism was not the “truth” about Hindus and Muslims. It was constructed and promoted as such by the British, partly because it suited them to divide India into communities and partly because the “natives,” the British argued, could not constitute a “modern” nation. They could think only in terms of premodern religious communities.

Second, over time even small clashes between Hindus and Muslims have been interpreted through the master narrative. “Trivial” incidents between Hindu and Muslim individuals become battles between the two communities, for these incidents come to be, and have often been, “contextualized” or “represented” in terms of the master narrative, lending excessive rigidity to communal divisions and directly contributing to rising levels of communal violence.

Finally, it is impossible to establish the truth about what happened, about cause and effect in communal violence. Contemporary communal violence has become horribly tangled in discursive “contestations” and politically manipulated “representations.” Indeed, facts and representations can not be separated. The claim is not that facts do not exist, but that the most important facts necessary to make causal arguments simply can not be culled from the morass of representations. It follows that in matters such as identity conflicts, standard social science is impossible. The best that the social scientist can do is to contest the discourses or representations that “harm” the “common people,” not seek after facts or causes and effects. While the first argument deals with the construction of the master narrative and the second with its historical and contemporary power, the third is more radical and makes by far the most quintessentially postmodern claim, that facts and representations are inseparable.

This paper will explore the second and third arguments, but not the first, which falls in the domain of historians. Both arguments are results of excessive aggregation. The postmodern analyst of communalism has gone to places where the communal fire has broken out, not where it never does or, if it does, is extinguished quickly. A sense of variance is missing. Variance matters, for it can test whether the master narrative has the power assigned to it or whether facts and representations can be separated. In an analytic world marked by variation, aggregation of cases that look similar can not produce a general theory.

It is necessary first to distinguish between communal conflict and communal identity-formation. Communal identities and communal peace can coexist; communal identity does not necessarily lead to conflict. In the Indian state of Kerala, religious identities are a principal basis of state politics, yet communal violence is rare. My critique of postmodern approaches does not extend to their ability to explain the
formation of communal identities. The outcome (dependent variable) I seek to explain is communal conflict, not communal identities.

The project from which this paper emerges is based on controlled comparisons of variance. The project studies six towns arranged in three pairs. Each pair includes a town where communal violence is endemic, and one where it is rare. Roughly similar Hindu-Muslim percentages in the towns’ populations constitute the minimum control in each pair. The first pair, Aligarh and Calicut, is based on population percentages only. The second pair, Hyderabad and Lucknow, adds two controls, local Muslim rule and reasonable cultural similarities. The third pair, Ahmedabad and Surat, comes from a single state, Gujarat, and shares history, language, and culture, but not endemic communal violence.

Why was similarity in demographic proportions chosen as the minimum control in each pair? Both in India’s popular discourse and in theories about Muslim political behavior, the size of the community is considered to be highly significant. Politicians generally called anti-Muslim, especially those belonging to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have often argued that the demographic distribution of Muslims makes them critical to electoral outcomes in India. The higher the number of Muslims in a given electoral constituency, argue BJP politicians, the greater the inclination of mainstream political parties to pander to their sectional/communal demands, and the lower the incentive for Muslims to build bridges with Hindus.

Leading Muslim politicians also point to the significance of demography, though their reasoning is different. The higher the number of Muslims in a town, they argue, the greater the political threat felt by Hindu communalists, who react with hostility to legitimate Muslim anxieties about politics and identity. An unjustified, even self-serving, opposition on the part of Hindu communalists, they argue, is the source of communal hostilities. The causation is, of course, reversed in the Hindu nationalist argument. For them, the trouble begins with Muslims. Their number in many towns and constituencies makes them more or less openly communal; they are nevertheless “appeased” by mainstream parties for electoral reasons, which in turn leads to a “Hindu reaction.” Thus, both extremes of the political spectrum rely heavily on demography for their explanations.

These popular arguments about demography are to some extent shared by social scientists. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, for example, argue that if a town or constituency has a Muslim majority or plurality, Muslims typically favor confessional parties, not the mainstream intercommunal parties. Muslims support the intercommunal parties when their share of the population or electorate is small. Smaller numbers make it rational to seek the security of a large, powerful mainstream party.

Can one find cases — towns or constituencies — where similar demographic distributions lead to very different forms of political behavior? Selecting from a larger sample of such cases, the project described above seeks to compare three pairs of
town where a rough similarity in demographic proportions coexists with variance in Hindu and Muslim politics. Different patterns of Hindu and Muslim politics are, in turn, linked to the absence or presence of communal violence.

This paper presents materials on the second pair, Hyderabad and Lucknow, while using the other pairs as supplements to the argument. Hyderabad and Lucknow have much in common. Known as historical centers of “Indo-Muslim” culture, they were ruled by Muslim princes, called the Nizams in Hyderabad and Nawabs in Lucknow, for a long time. Hindu and Muslim elites participated in the culture of the court, and shrines were shared by the masses of both communities. Finally, and significantly for post-1947 democratic politics, the proportion of Hindus and Muslims in the population of these towns has roughly been in the same range. In Hyderabad, Muslims have constituted 35–37 percent of the population since 1961, and in Lucknow 28–30 percent.

Communal violence, however, is a study in contrast. Lucknow’s only major Hindu-Muslim riot of this century took place in 1924 and is not even part of the town’s memory. There were no riots during India’s partition in 1947 or after the demolition of the Baburi mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992. Hyderabad’s communal peace was first broken in 1938. Turbulence continued from 1938 to 1948, followed by an uneasy communal peace in the 1950s. In the 1960s Hyderabad experienced communal disturbances in eight out of ten years. The period since 1978 has been especially violent. With the exception of 1986–89, riots have taken place every year, some with horrendous brutality.

Why have the two cities diverged so much? First, cultural similarities notwithstanding, historical legacies of the two towns have been different. Independent Lucknow inherited sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis but communal peace between Hindus and Muslims. Post-1948 Hyderabad inherited the reverse. (The term “communalism” is used in India for interreligious strife, and “sectarianism” for intrareligious conflict.) Second, Hyderabad politicians have on the whole used communal polarization and violence as a strategic political tool, whereas Lucknow politicians have sought to build bridges in times of communal tension. Third, a large fraction of Hindus and Muslims is locked in an economic symbiosis in Lucknow, whereas no such interlocking interdependence marks Hyderabad’s economy. Possible relationships among three variables — historical legacies, political strategies, and economic structure — need to be explored. The notion of networks of civic engagement explains differences observed in the two towns. The violent towns support postmodern arguments about violence, but the peaceful towns do not. “Representations” can easily triumph over “facts” if networks of intercommunal engagement have collapsed. Historically, peaceful towns are endowed with such networks. They prevent the transformation of tensions and trivial incidents into riots and violence.
Two Local Histories, One National History

The Communal Inheritance of Hyderabad  India under the British had two broad political arrangements. British India, about two-thirds of the country, was directly administered by the British, whereas princely India, the remaining third, was indirectly governed. The Indian princes had power over the day-to-day governance of their territories, but the British were sovereign.

Communal amity, it is generally argued, marked princely India, partly because electoral pressures did not exist there, as they did in British India. Politicians did not have to mobilize Hindus and Muslims to win power; the prince instead would distribute power through patronage, keeping some kind of balance between the two communities. The Hyderabad Nizams were part of princely India until 1947–48, and Lucknow Nawabs until 1856.

What was the state of Hindu-Muslim relations in Hyderabad under the seventh Nizam, who ruled from 1911 to 1948, the period most relevant for our purpose? Muslims dominated state employment. Though 10 percent of the state’s population, they held over 75 percent of jobs. State employment was based not on competition but on patronage. The economic system was feudal. The feudal estates covered about 40 percent of the state, 37 percent of its villages, and a third of the state’s population. Of the seven biggest feudal estates, each over a hundred villages, six were Muslim, and one Hindu. The industrial sector was dominated by Hindus, but it was much too small to affect the overall power structure.

In the 1920s two sets of rival religious organizations emerged in Hyderabad. Their aim was to proselytize. The Arya Samaj (or Samaj) was the main Hindu organization. The Samaj argued that centuries of “alien” rule — first the Mughal, then the British — had weakened Hinduism, and practices such as idol worship had corroded its spirit. To revive itself, according to the Samaj, the community needed to be made conscious of its heritage from the days before idol worship and to reclaim those Hindus who had converted to Islam and Christianity.

Islamic proselytization was conducted primarily by the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM, or Majlis). The MIM was born in 1926. It sought to unite the various Islamic sects for the preservation of Islam. Both the Samaj and MIM targeted the middle and poorer classes. Though the court-inspired syncretistic lifestyles continued to mark the lives of Hindus and Muslims at the upper echelons of society, organizations propagating religious pride penetrated the base of society by the 1930s.

By 1937–38 the religious campaigns led by the MIM and Samaj culminated in competitive proselytization that generated considerable acrimony and viciousness. Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in Hyderabad city for the first time in April 1938. More riots followed in June 1938 and March 1939.

The communal transformation of Hyderabad’s consciousness was completed
between 1937 and 1948, when mass politics emerged. In this period, the Nizam’s state had to deal with four kinds of organizations: the communal Hindu (the Arya Samaj), the communal Muslin (MIM), the nonviolent interreligious (the Congress), and the violent interreligious (the Communists). The Nizam suppressed the first and the third, promoted the second, and fluctuated toward the fourth, depending on whether the Communists were more against the Congress party or the Hyderabad government.

Amid the communal tensions and violence, two political movements emerged in the city. One was led by the Arya Samaj, the other by the Hyderabad State Congress party. Both chose the method of civil disobedience (satyagraha), already popularized by Mahatma Gandhi all over British India. Fighting for civil rights, especially the right to religious freedom, the Arya Samaj openly merged religion and politics. Institutionally separate and founded on an interreligious principle, the Hyderabad Congress sought to fight not only for civil rights but also for democratic government.

The Nizam was ready for some devolution of power, but not for democracy. He viewed as subversive the Congress party’s notion that popular elections were necessary and the Arya Samaj’s idea that religious freedom was a civil right. The Nazam believed in subjecthood, not citizenship. His government banned the Congress within weeks and did not lift the ban until eight years later in 1946. The Arya Samaj was also banned. The MIM, however, was not.

To strengthen its political and religious campaign, the MIM created a paramilitary organization, called the Razakars, in 1938. It also developed a new ideological doctrine, proclaiming Muslims as a ruling race (hakim kaum) of Hyderabad. “Hyderabad does not need any democratic system of Government,” argued the MIM. “The MIM policy is to keep the sovereignty of His Exalted Highness intact and to prevent Hindus from establishing supremacy over Muslims.”

The final test of this doctrine came in 1946–47, when it became clear that the British would leave India but partition of the subcontinent would separate Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Where would the princely states go? To India or Pakistan? Would they be independent?

The MIM and the Nizam sought independence for Hyderabad. India’s new leaders did not agree, and the British also advised the Nizam to merge with India and seek the best terms possible within a merger. The Razakars, the MIM’s shock troops, launched a violent campaign to achieve independence, terrorizing Hindus as well as dissenters within the Muslim community. According to a typical eyewitness account of their activities:

Being in a district I was seeing and also hearing the acts of the Razakars. At many places they had looted the property and burnt the houses of Hindus. At some places they had killed them. Panic-stricken but mostly well-to-do Hindus were rushing
Ashutosh Varshney

across the border. The Razakars had taken the law into their own hands and were searching the luggage of every Hindu in trains. . . . Some Hindus travelled in Muslim garb. . . . Government officers content themselves by looking on these acts with indifference and . . . sometimes with amusement.33

In what was called a “police action,” the Indian armed forces finally launched an attack on Hyderabad on September 13, 1948, and overran the state in five days. The Nizam surrendered on September 18. He agreed to popular rule. Delhi installed him as a titular head of the state. The Razakars, too, gave in. Hyderabad became part of India, but the legacy for communal relations was awful.

**Lucknow’s Heritage: Sectarian Strife, Communal Amity** After the disintegration of the Mughal empire in the early eighteenth century, Lucknow was ruled by a succession of Muslim princes, the Nawabs, roughly from 1739 to 1857. The princely state was called Awadh. The British annexed Awadh in 1856. A soldiers’ mutiny followed in 1857, spreading to several parts of north India, with Lucknow as one of its centers. The mutiny was eventually suppressed by the British.

In the twentieth century the principal political contestation in Lucknow has been sectarian, not communal. Shia-Sunni riots erupted regularly between 1905 and 1909 and between 1935 and 1942. In Hyderabad, too, the Shia community has lived for centuries. Indeed, before the Nizams Hyderabad was ruled by Shia princes. The sectarian divide, however, was not politicized.

Why is Lucknow’s history divided along sectarian rather than communal lines? Why has sectarian passion coexisted with communal quiescence? First, the Lucknow Nawabs were Shia, whereas Hyderabad’s Nizam were Sunni. Not only did the court have Shia influences, as one would expect, but the Nawabs, through elaborate public rituals and Shia-inspired monuments, interwove Shi’ism into the popular culture of Lucknow. The city came to epitomize Shia pride.34 When Shia rule was at its peak, the doctrinal disputes between Sunnis and Shias, focusing on the status of the first three successors of Prophet Muhammad and the mourning rituals of Muharram, remained dormant. The objective situation changed after the British conquest of Lucknow. The Sunnis progressed economically as artisans and small businessmen, whereas the Shia nobility, unable to alter its grand life-style, stagnated on small British pensions or rental incomes.35

The Sunnis finally asserted themselves in the twentieth century. Shia rituals and practices in Lucknow were called un-Islamic by Sunni leaders.36 Some of the Shia pageantry and spectacle indeed came very close to Hindu festivals. The Hindus participated in Muharram in large numbers, more for the sake of the spectacle and pageantry, less for the ritualistic meaning of sorrow.37 Frequent violence attended the reversal of Shia-Sunni fortunes.

Second, in the “galaxy” of Lucknow’s Muslim rulers there is no figure like the
seventh Nizam of Hyderabad. None is associated with communalism or accused of having built a communal regime. Lucknow Nawabs were associated with resisting the British, not India. In popular iconography, the mutiny of 1857, centered in Lucknow, is sometimes called the first war of independence. In contrast, Hyderabad’s seventh Nizam wanted independence and offered armed resistance to the idea of integration with India. The two local histories, thus, had a very different discursive relationship with the mainstream of Indian nationalism.

In and of themselves, the divergent discursive possibilities of local histories were not enough. Organizations involved in mass politics played a very different role in the two cities in the 1920s and 1930s. Emerging in the 1930s, mass politics took the form of communalism in Hyderabad, led by the MIM on the one hand and Arya Samaj on the other. Of the secular parties that could have mobilized the masses in Hyderabad, the Congress was banned, and the Communists were popular, but only in a fraction of the countryside. Mass politics in Lucknow was led either by the Congress party, which sought to build Hindu-Muslim alliances, or by the various sectarian organizations, which led to Shia-Sunni riots. Unlike Hyderabad’s MIM, the Muslim League, the leading separatist party in Lucknow, was an elitist organization. It did not have a mass base. Sectarian clashes continued in the 1940s when the Muslim League launched its campaign to unite the Muslims for a separate state of Pakistan. Some Shia organizations took an explicit stand against the “Sunni character” of the Muslim League and against the demand for Pakistan. “Why [are] the Shias opposed to Pakistan? . . . Shias . . . are in a minority amongst the Muslims . . . [T]heir principal oppressors [are] their own brethren in faith, the Sunni Muslims. What will be their position under the absolute Sunni rule in Pakistan can well be imagined.”

To sum up, sectarian mobilization in Lucknow paralleled Hindu-Muslim campaigns in Hyderabad. At independence, Hyderabad inherited sectarian calm and communal hostility; Lucknow, its opposite. Local historical legacies differed, even though Hindu-Muslim antagonism formed the “master narrative” of Indian history at that time.

Two Versions of Democratic Politics: Polarization and Bridge Building

Postindependence Hyderabad Politics: Deepening Historical Cleavages With the defeat of the Nizam and Razakars, an entire system collapsed. A new ideology of popular elections replaced hereditary rule. The Nizam’s bureaucracy was reorganized, his armed forces folded up, and the feudal estates abolished. Such sweeping changes hurt the Muslims disproportionately, for the Hindus constituted a small proportion of the Nizam’s police, army, and civil administration. The Muslim fate underwent a sharp and tragic metamorphosis. Resentment, agony, and bitterness marked the mood.
In this atmosphere the MIM was reborn in 1957.\textsuperscript{42} To avoid being banned, the new MIM committed itself to the Indian constitution. The MIM quickly became the party of Hyderabad Muslims. Since most Muslims were concentrated in the old city and their numbers constituted a large proportion of the electorate there, the MIM became a strong local party soon after its rebirth. By the late 1970s it became so powerful that the Congress party began to seek an alliance with it. In 1986 the MIM, with the support of the Congress, formed the municipal government of Hyderabad.

With the reinvigoration of MIM, two more developments took place. First, the Hindu nationalists acquired a political base in Hyderabad, raising their share of popular vote with each election. Second, communal violence reemerged after a quiet decade in the 1950s. In the 1960s there were riots in eight out of ten years in Hyderabad.\textsuperscript{43} After 1978 the trend towards communal violence took a turn for the worse. Except for the period 1986–89, riots took place virtually every year between 1978 and 1993, often many times in the same year. Table 1 presents a list of riots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Reported Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>March-April</td>
<td>Police atrocity towards Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Hindu temple desecrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Muslim call for shopkeepers' strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Parliamentary elections, stabbing of a Hindu boy; followed by a funeral procession with the body of the deceased draped in Janata party flag</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Petty quarrel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Arrest of a wrestler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Municipal elections due; playing of music before a mosque during the procession of Bonalu, a Hindu religious festival; elections postponed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Hindu marriage procession playing music in front of a mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Election violence between MIM and BJP supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Hindu marriage procession playing music in front of a mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Simultaneous occurrence of Ganesh procession and Id</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>By-election clash between MIM and TDP workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Attack on Bonalu procession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Violence during Hindu (Ganesh) and Muslim (Punkha) processions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Assembly elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small clashes the year round, no major violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Land dispute between two speculators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Small Clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Murder of a wrestler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Destruction of Baburi mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>As above; after effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and of their immediate causes, which have ranged from elections, processions, and desecrations, on the one hand, to petty quarrels and land deals, on the other.

The sheer frequency of riots since 1978 suggests the emergence of what Paul Brass calls an “institutionalized riot system.”\(^{44}\) A gang of killers, generally organized around the leadership of wrestlers, ostensibly aimed at protecting communities and shielded by politicians, has been ready to launch into a wave of violence at virtually any pretext. Even trivial incidents such as a quarrel between two teenagers or the arrest of a wrestler have received full-blown insertion into the “master narrative” of communalism.

What evidence exists for the emergence of an institutionalized riot system? As a psychologist trying to understand the roots of communal violence in Hyderabad, Sudhir Kakar interviewed many wrestlers in Hyderabad and found that wrestling schools had been turned into institutions of communal violence.\(^{45}\) Called “criminal characters” by the police, the wrestlers were seen as valiant “warriors” in their neighborhoods. The “warriors” protected neighborhoods against and avenged the depredations of the police and other communities, intervened between the police and the common folk, organized relief during riots, and remained “good” or “pious” Muslims or Hindus throughout. They took pride in violence, saying it was for the defense of the community or religion. They flaunted political connections, suggesting how the police could not touch them because they were protected by political parties, MIM in some cases, BJP in others, the Congress in still others. During riots they stopped killing, they said, only when it was clear that they had killed more people than the wrestlers of the other community. No one dared testify against them in a court of law, making conviction impossible even when prosecutions could be brought forth. The distinction between crime and valor thus disappeared for a large mass of Muslims and Hindus in the old city of Hyderabad.\(^{46}\)

Second, religious processions have been the most common immediate cause of communal violence in Hyderabad. Yet new festivals have literally been invented for political purposes by communal partisans. Hyderabad Hindus, for example, had no tradition of large-scale Ganesh festivals. They only had small Ganesh celebrations confined to households and neighborhoods. In the late 1970s the smaller processions were merged into a truly massive, several miles long, citywide annual procession, consisting of thousands of participants. As the procession marched through markets and neighborhoods, Muslim shops and houses would often be the target of arson and attack. The first chairman of the festival, a key member of Arya Samaj in Hyderabad, admits that its purpose was to demonstrate to the Muslims how strong Hindus could be, especially because the “Muslims had started causing too much nuisance” by the late 1970s.\(^{47}\)

Not to be left behind, the MIM engineered a new collective rite for Muslims, called the Pankha procession, in honor of a local Sufi shrine. Sufism, a paradigm of syncretistic Islam famous for bringing Hindus and Muslims together, was turned
into a vehicle of communal assertion. In 1984 the Pankha and Ganesh processions followed in quick succession. The worst violence of the decade took place.

Finally, politicians have used riots. In 1989 M. Channa Reddy, a Congress party leader, became chief minister of the state. Ministerial berths were not given to some key members of a faction of the party. The adversarial faction decided to embarrass the government of its own party. As the ever-present communal rioting broke out, the adversaries of the chief minister smelled an opportunity. Riots remained out of control more or less continuously for three months between October and December 1990. Unable to control the law and order situation, the chief minister eventually resigned on December 13, 1990, and a new government, under a different faction leader, was sworn in. Raging for weeks, riots immediately stopped. There was no touch of subtlety in the transfer of power. The link was too obvious to be missed.


In contrast, there were no communal riots in Lucknow during India’s partition, when much of north India burned. Nor have there been any riots since then, despite a postindependence political novelty. Since the 1950s, Hindu nationalist parties — first the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), then its successor, the BJP — have been a big political force in the city. Over the last four decades the Hindu nationalists have received 30 to 40 percent of the local vote and won on average half of the city’s assembly seats. They have also formed the city’s municipal government.

What explains the rise of Hindu nationalists in a town not marked by serious communal tensions? And why did the rise of Hindu nationalists not lead to communal violence? The first question is answered here, the second later.

As a result of India’s partition, nearly 30,000 Hindu refugees arrived in Lucknow from Pakistan from 1947 to 1951. They constituted roughly 5 percent of the town’s population in 1951. Involuntary displacement, loss of property, and often loss of life among siblings and relatives aroused bitterness in most refugees and a desire for retribution in many. However, after the initial pains of displacement the refugees were absorbed into the city’s historic traditions.

Second, in 1952 land reforms abolished absentee landlordism (zamindari). Incensed with the Congress party for abolishing their privileges, large numbers of Hindu feudal lords became Hindu nationalists. In addition to their anti-Muslim rhetoric, the Hindu nationalists also supported the traditional caste hierarchy of Hinduism at that time. The feudal lords were at the top of the social hierarchy; most of them lived in Lucknow city; and many had a reasonably large following.

Finally, because government employment provided the biggest source of liveli-
hood, Lucknow also had an exceptionally large concentration of the more literate, upper Hindu castes. Hindu nationalist defense of caste hierarchy attracted many in the upper castes. Thus, Hindu nationalism in Lucknow has not been driven by anti-Muslim fervor, but by a mixture of motivations.

Since India’s partition in 1947, the period between 1990 and 1993 provided the most critical test for Lucknow’s Hindu-Muslim relations. A mass mobilization was launched by Hindu nationalists to destroy the Baburi mosque in Ayodhya, a town only 80 miles away from Lucknow. Though it led to widespread communal violence, Lucknow remained free of riots.

The district magistrate, the civil servant responsible for law and order, formed peace committees that had Hindu as well as Muslim leaders. He frequently consulted with them, acted upon every rumor and neutralized most of them, and built up allies in the top political leadership, including that of the BJP. The district magistrate admits that without political cooperation and the peace committees, he would not have succeeded. At any rate, Lucknow’s peace was maintained. Yet another political earthquake, the worst since partition, was unable to break the city’s inter-communal edifice. Only some cracks appeared.

**Variance in Political Intentionality**

Unlike Hyderabad, politicians in Lucknow have not undermined the preexisting bridges between Hindus and Muslims. Though ideologically wedded to an anti-Muslim rhetoric, even Hindu nationalists have not promoted communal violence. Partly, Hindu nationalists, to be a political force, simply did not need polarization. The Muslim community had internal differences to the extent that some Shia leaders occasionally supported the Hindu nationalists. Moreover, the dispossessed absentee landlords and their dependents and a large concentration of upper castes provided a substantial electoral base. These groups cared more for the traditional social hierarchy, less for anti-Muslim communalism.

The MIM, in contrast, thrives on polarization. It is a local, not national or state-level, party. The city of Hyderabad is the be-all and end-all of its life. Since the city has a large Muslim population, the strategy of polarization has many electoral payoffs and few risks. If the MIM develops state-level ambitions, it will have to examine whether polarization in Hyderabad causes losses in constituencies where Muslims are fewer in number and is not enough to guarantee victories without alliances.

With its larger political ambition, the BJP asks both local and state-level questions, and increasingly national questions as well. Its anti-Muslim rhetoric does not have the same resonance everywhere. The local, the state, and the national wings of the party may see their interests differently. Polarization is not necessarily in the interests of a party that has national ambitions and diverse tiers of functioning. So long as Hyderabad remains its focus, the MIM will not acquire any such complexity. Even though both MIM and BJP are communal, their structure of intentionality differs.
Economics as Integration, Economics as Separation

What is the routine life of Hindus and Muslims like in the two cities? What kind of work do they do? Which economic structure works better for communal peace, and why?

Muslims never formed the business communities in Lucknow and Hyderabad. They were primarily in government employment. A significant fraction was also employed by the feudal lords living in the cities. In Hyderabad, the Nizam’s armed forces, bureaucracy, and police were disbanded or restructured, forcing a large Muslim migration to Pakistan. From Lucknow, too, there was a substantial migration of middle class professionals after 1947, not because the state bureaucracy was terminated but because it was hard to tell in advance what would happen to Muslims in India. Muslims as a proportion of the two police forces and bureaucracies declined significantly in both towns, though no hard figures can be given.60

At independence, Muslims in both towns were at opposite ends of the economy. The very rich and the poor stayed in India, the former because they had high property stakes, and the latter because they were too poor to migrate. The middle classes had considerably thinned. The Hindus could be found in all classes. They also dominated local businesses.

How did this economic structure develop after independence? What consequences, if any, did it have for communal relations?

Lucknow’s economic developments are relatively straightforward. The embroidered textiles industry, known as Chikan and Zardozi and based on the special skills of Muslim artisans, progressively became the heart of Lucknow’s economy. Embroidery is a skill not easily replicable by machines. The use of modern technology is minimal, and there are no factories in the production process. It is a huge putting out system based on piece-wages and is classified in the informal or unorganized sector.61 In 1972 there were approximately 45,000 workers in the industry.62 By the late 1980s they grew to between 75,000 and 100,000.63

If we assume a family size of six to seven and two workers per family — fair assumptions, given descriptions of the industry — about 200,000 to 300,000 people are partially or wholly dependent on embroidered textiles in Lucknow.64 Since the town’s population was about 1.8 million in 1991, 10–15 percent of its population would have been involved in the industry. Moreover, even if 90 percent of the industry’s workers were Muslim (see below), between 30 to 50 percent of the Muslim population (numbering 180,000 to 270,000) was interlocked with Hindu traders.

The size of the industry acquires a deeper meaning for Hindu-Muslim relations when we note four more of its characteristics. First, the workers are mostly Sunni Muslim, and many are women. Second, the traders-cum-entrepreneurs are overwhelmingly Hindu. Third, the division of labor is informal; there are no wage contracts. Finally, “none of the artisans can do solely all items of work and turn out
finished product.65 Different artisans, with primordial specializations, are involved in different parts of the process. Lacking explicit and formal contracts, the system works largely on trust born out of an economic symbiosis: each step in the process is dependent on the preceding step. If the tailors do not deliver, printers can not work; if the printers do not work, the materials can not be sent to the embroiders. A large network of agents, mostly Muslim, manages the operation in key stages.

Thus, a vast network of intercommunal engagement between Hindus and Muslims has come to exist in Lucknow. If communal violence takes place in the city, argued all traders interviewed in this study, the economy would collapse. Embroidered textiles have become the economic foundation of communal peace in Lucknow.

Nothing comparable exists in Hyderabad. It is industrially far more advanced than Lucknow, but no single industry employs more than 10–15,000 people.66 After economic stagnation in the 1950s and 1960s, Hyderabad’s Muslim community has received a tremendous economic boost from migration to the Middle East in the last two decades. As a result, Muslim businesses in the informal sector have sprouted in large numbers, and the informal sector of the city is now 65–70 percent Muslim.67 Some interdependence between the two communities marks this sector, but no systematic symbiosis exists.

To sum up, over the last fifteen to twenty years, Hyderabad Muslims have done much better than their Lucknow counterparts. Their success, however, has led, not to a reduction, but to an increase in communal tensions, partly through a strengthening of the MIM. The relative economic betterment of Muslims is not a cause of increased tensions. An absence of symbiotic linkages is. The two communities do not constitute a web of interdependence.

**How Local Networks of Engagement Matter**

History, economics, and politics have thus run in the direction of Hindu-Muslim peace in Lucknow and conflict in Hyderabad. Are politics and economics merely an expression of history? If so, what explains the difference is simply a path dependence on history rather than three separate causes.

In an ideal analytical world subsumable in a regression equation, tests of “multicollinearity” can be conducted. The world of communalism and large historical trends, however, do not lend themselves easily to “identifying variables” and regressions. Qualitative logic rather than statistical testing is our basic tool. What turns up if we apply this yardstick?

As in Hyderabad, communal tensions do appear in Lucknow, and nasty rumors spread. However, Lucknow is able to manage them, while in Hyderabad they lead to violence. Indeed, symbolically charged and sacrilegious provocations which have repeatedly precipitated riots in Hyderabad were also tried in Lucknow between 1990
and 1993 by those who wished to create riots. A Hindu holy man (sadhu) was killed, and a rumor circulated that a Muslim had killed him. It turned out that a Hindu had killed the holy man. Pork was thrown into a mosque, presumably by Hindus. It was discovered that a Muslim was responsible. Similarly, color was thrown into a mosque during the Hindu festival of Holi. As is evident from Table 1, any of these events in Hyderabad would have been contextualized, been woven into the narrative of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, been used as an occasion by politicians to make provocative speeches, and led to retaliatory violence. In Lucknow, the district administration was able to catch the culprit quickly in each case and present him before his own community, the peace committee, and the press.

Thus, the same provocations had different outcomes. Why? We need to understand the mechanisms that prevent the transformation of provocations and tensions into riots in one city, but not in another.

Local networks of intercommunal engagement are particularly valuable. In Lucknow, dependent on an industry lacking formal contracts, so many Muslims and Hindus are interlocked in daily economic relationships that peace committees at the time of tensions are simply an extension of the preexisting local networks of engagement. A considerable reservoir of social trust is formed out of everyday economic interactions. Routine familiarity facilitates communication between the two communities; better communication prevents the transformation of “facts” into politically manipulable and conflict-generating “representations;” and familiarity and communication help the local administration keep peace.

It may be argued, as Robert Putnam does, that trust developed in vertical settings is inherently fragile.68 How sturdy is the intercommunal trust in Lucknow, formed as it primarily is in a vertically organized economy? It is hard to answer this question with certainty, for it is impossible to separate trust from interest in Lucknow. Many Hindu businessmen in the embroidered textiles industry are members of the BJP. However, they depend on Muslim workers for their trade. Replacement of Muslim craftswomen by Hindu workers has high transition costs, as skills would have to be taught afresh, whereas Muslim girls learn such skills at home simply by watching their mothers and sisters. Riots in Lucknow will entail loss of lives as well as a breakdown of the local economy. Those hurt will be not only the poor Muslims but also the rich Hindu nationalists dependent on them. Hindu and Muslim political leaders thus “naturally” come together to contain tensions and rumors. And their networks down to the neighborhood level protect peace.

The interests of Hindu nationalists at the state level may lie in a communal polarization, but at the local level such a polarization will hurt them economically. They also do not need a polarization in Lucknow, for they have done well politically without it. Were the Hindu nationalists electorally desperate in Lucknow, a clash between their economic and political interests might emerge. Whether trust can survive without a foundation of interests can be tested at that point. Meanwhile, the
relevant point is not that a vertical setting can not sustain social trust, but that a situation of economic symbiosis can generate solid networks of civic engagement and enough trust to facilitate communication between the two communities. Without these networks the local administration feels quite helpless.

City-level peace committees are ineffective in Hyderabad. First, the top local leaders of the MIM and BJP can not be brought together on these committees, for they are already committed to a strategy of polarization and have formed networks of thugs and wrestlers engaged in politically motivated killings. Second, a very large mass of Hindus and Muslims does not meet in a civic setting, economic or social, where mutual trust can be formed. One can actually live an entire life in Hyderabad’s old city without spending more than a small amount of time with members of the other community. Lacking both political support at the top and networks below, even competent police and civil administrators watch an unfolding riot helplessly. Peace committees consist essentially of civic-minded citizens. These committees are effective only in some neighborhoods where everyday contacts have managed to stay robust. In the city as a whole, such micro-successes are unable to neutralize the depredations of leading politicians.

The other towns in the project witnessed similar processes. The difference lay neither in the absence of religious identities nor the experience of tensions, rumors, and small clashes. The presence or absence of local networks of engagement was decisive. Calicut’s social trust stemmed from Hindu-Muslim participation in key festivals, and integrated neighborhood lives, while in Aligarh, such interactions were few and far between. In Surat, networks built in the economy and neighborhood life were again the bedrock of the town’s communal harmony, while Ahmedabad has lost its Hindu-Muslim links.

**Conclusion**

We are now in a position to analyze the relevance of postmodern approaches to communal conflict. The postmodern explanation of contemporary ethnic and communal conflicts is so far based primarily on incidents of violence. When the causes of peace are investigated, their arguments and approaches break down. Since, following the principle of variance, we can not build a good theory of communal violence without studying peace, the postmodern theory suffers from “selection bias.” Only under certain institutional conditions does the postmodern argument about ethnic conflict hold. The local networks of intercommunal engagement constitute the principal institutional variable explaining the outcome. In their absence, the master narrative acquires the powers ascribed to it, and the battle of representations and contextualization overcomes the regime of facts.

In the cases where the postmodern argument does not hold, the overpowering of
the master narrative by more regionally or locally specific narratives is less troubling for postmodernists. Given their distrust of master narratives, of modernity, nationalism, and communalism, they have often celebrated “local resistance” and its “authenticity.” Distinguishing facts from representations is much more damaging. In most of its variants, postmodernism insists on the inseparability of facts and representations.73

Because of prior networks of intercommunal engagement, facts can be established in peaceful towns; self-interested representations do not displace them. In violence-prone towns, ascertaining facts is considerably harder, perhaps impossible. Violence is quickly inserted into narratives, and the politics of representations takes over. Powerful groups seek to turn violence to their advantage, often instigating it as well. Evidence that could establish cause and effect in a linear fashion is wiped out, making it hard for the researcher to establish truth, and oral testimonies are insufficient as a substitute. We are indeed in the postmodern analytic space. In peaceful towns, however, the processes are different. Troublemakers, in an attempt to create riots, may engage in symbolically charged provocations, but local administrations are able to prevent communal violence from breaking out or succeed in controlling it quickly. Before facts dissolve into a battle of representations, they are presented as facts and accepted as such. Postmodern analysis begins to make sense in violent hells. In lands of relative peace, its utility must be considered limited.

NOTES

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1. Throughout this paper the terms “ethnic” and “communal” conflict are used interchangeably. This terminological practice is consistent with the broad definition of ethnicity (that is, group identity) proposed by Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

2. Internal differences exist within postmodern and/or poststructural scholarship, just as they do within the mainstream social sciences. In both cases, the internal differences are less wide than those between postmodern approaches and the mainstream social sciences. For a useful overview of postmodernism and the differences within it, see Pauline Marie Rosenau, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). As is widely known, Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida have provided the principal theoretical inspiration for the postmodern literature.


4. For example, Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus Post Modernity,” New German Critique (Winter

5. For what they mean, see Rosenau, pp. xi–xiv.
6. Scholars of India are among the most widely noted in the postmodern genre, especially the members of the “subaltern school.” Eight volumes of Subaltern Studies (Oxford University Press) have so far come out. The group consists mainly of historians, anthropologists, and literary critics. Partha Chatterjee and Paul Brass are among the few political scientists who have written in the postmodern genre, the latter independently. See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Paul Brass, Theft of an Idol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); and Paul Brass, ed., Riots and Pogroms (London: Macmillan, 1996).
7. Analogous arguments have also been made about other ex-colonial societies. For Africa, see Leroy Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and, for Latin America, Frederick Cooper, Allen Isaacman, Florencia Mallon, William Roseberry, and Steve Stern, eds., Confronting Historical Paradigms (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
9. To some, this interpretation would mean that the master narrative has acquired hegemony in a Gramscian sense, in that more and more “natives” have come to believe it. Others would make a distinction between hegemony and dominance, the latter term meaning imposition from above but not acceptance from below.
10. Brass, Theft of an Idol, and Riots and Pogroms, respectively.
12. Brass, Riots; and Pandey.
13. Some scholars writing in the postmodern mode may quibble with my summary “representations” of their arguments. The arguments are far more complex, they may contend. However, summaries are statements about the average tendency, not about the entire complexity. They are not only unavoidable but also necessary. In the language of music, a concerto is identified by the principal score, not by its entire orchestral accompaniment, or by its key, not by its entire panoply of notes. A better statement of the central tendencies of postmodern approaches to ethnic conflict and identities is welcome.
16. For a frank admission by the doyen of Kerala’s Communist politics that religion has played a significant role in Kerala politics, see E. M. S. Namboodiripad, “Presidential Address,” in International Congress of Kerala Studies, Addresses and Abstracts, vol. 1 (Trivandrum: A. K. G. Centre for Research and Studies, 1994).
17. Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) p. 196, show that Muslims constitute more than 20 percent of the electorate in 197 out of 545 parliamentary constituencies in India. In a first-past-the-post system, where 30 percent of the vote is often enough to win a seat, these percentages make Muslims highly significant electorally.
19. Syed Shahabuddin, a prominent Muslim leader, has often made this argument in lectures, discussions, and political speeches.
22. A small riot also took place in July 1940. The Pioneer (Lucknow), July 8, 1940.
26. The English translations are Council for the Unity of Muslims for MIM and Society of Pure Hindus for Arya Samaj.
29. A fifth group, the Mulki (Sons of the Soil) League, fell by the wayside as mass politics took over. It was made up of Hindu and Muslim aristocrats based in the capital city and distrusted mass politics.
30. The Nizam found the MIM useful as well as disagreeable. See Benichou, “From Autocracy.”
31. See ibid. ch. 3.
32. The various accounts are V. P. Menon, Integration of the India States (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1956); Ali Yavar Jung, Hyderabad in Retrospect (Bombay: Bennet, Coleman and Co., 1949); Mir Laiq Ali, Tragedy of Hyderabad (Karachi: Pakistan Cooperative Society, 1962); and Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1951).
33. Fareed Mirza, Pre and Post Police Action Days in Erstwhile Hyderabad State: What I Saw, Felt and Did, pamphlet published by the author (Hyderabad: 1976), pp. 3, 13. For chilling details about the killing of Muslim dissidents, see Mirza, p. 25; and Ali Yavar Jung, pp. 38–41. About 40 percent of the respondents in my 140-household survey of Hyderabad were over sixty years old and could recall the Razakars in detail.
34. Even today, the spectacular buildings inspired by Shia history and called the Imambaras — literally, the House of Imams—stand out on Lucknow’s landscape.
38. Ninety percent of Muslims in my survey of Hyderabad called the seventh Nizam “secular” and religiously neutral. However, only half of the Hindus interviewed saw the Nizam that way, and a fourth called him “communal.” The Lucknow survey found no such disagreement. Not a single Hindu respondent called any of the Nawabs “communal.”
39. Based on a reading of government files in the U.P. State Archives, Lucknow, esp. file no. 65/1939, General Administration and “A Note on Shia-Sunni Troubles,” undated.
40. Lalljee, p. 32.
48. Interview with M. Channa Reddy, Hyderabad, March 10, 1995. Also interviews with several police and civil administrators stationed in Hyderabad in October-December 1990.
49. “Note on Shia-Sunni Trouble,” Lucknow Administration, undated, p. 7.
51. Based on Shankar Bose and V. B. Singh, State Elections in India (Delhi: Sage, 1988).
55. A large survey in 1954–56 found that in Lucknow “among the Hindus the upper castes are the most numerous, accounting for 31 percent of the total population.” Radhakamal Mukherjee and Baljit Singh, Social Profiles of a Metropolis (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 41.
58. Interview with Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, President of MIM, Hyderabad, October 24, 1993.
64. Singh et al., “Problems,” pp. 8–9.
66. Interview with the President of the Andhra Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Hyderabad, August 12, 1995.
67. Afzal Mohammed, “Role of Informal Sector in Urban Communities: A Case Study of Hyderabad City” (Hyderabad: Centre for Economic and Social Studies, 1994, typescript).
68. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), is highly doubtful about the sturdiness of trust built in vertical networks of relationships, as opposed to horizontal networks created on the basis of equality. It can, however, be shown that vertical arrangements can also be considerably robust if they are ideologically undergirded by a “moral economy” (as they were in India’s caste system for a long time) or by an economic symbiosis (as in the case of Lucknow’s textiles industry).
70. In Surat, the third historically peaceful town in the project, a nasty riot did take place after the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque. However, an overwhelming proportion of violence was confined to the new industrial slums. The old city witnessed some arson and looting but few deaths. Preexisting Hindu-Muslim networks prevented a conflagration in the old part of the town. No such networks existed in the newer shanty towns.
73. Rosenau, Postmodernism, chs. 1 and 8.