Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: Undertheorized Political Problems in the Founding Democratization Literature 1
ALFRED STE潘

PART I MANAGING POTENTIAL CULTURAL CONFLICTS DEMOCRATICALLY

1 Civil Society, Islam, and Ethnocommunal Conflict 17
ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

2 Debating Secession Peacefully and Democratically: The Case of Canada 41
RICHARD SIMEON

PART II TOWARD CREATING AND CONTROLLING DEMOCRATICALLY USABLE SECURITY SERVICES

3 The New “Double Challenge”: Democratic Control and Efficacy of Military, Police, and Intelligence 59
FELIPE AGUERO

4 Beyond Threats to Democracy from the Armed Forces, Police, and Intelligence: The Spanish Case 75
NARCÍS SERRA
Some other contributions in this volume focus on national-level political institutions, such as "asymmetric federalism." Drawing upon my research in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, I will focus on civil society, defined as the non-state sphere of our collective life, in which organizations relatively independent of the state exist and function. I do so to address the question of why ethnocommunal conflicts have been endemic in the world and to ask what kinds of civil society associations might inhibit outbreaks of such conflicts. As is well known, such conflicts have a negative impact on the quality, and sometimes the survival, of democracy. This new research presents a fresh diagnosis of ethnocommunal violence.

Where necessary, I will also make brief remarks on the relationship between Islam and conflict. In the current intellectual and political climate, a great deal of attention is being paid to the role of Islam in politics. Muslims are in a majority in two of the countries mentioned above—Indonesia and Malaysia—and a minority in India and Sri Lanka. India is among the oldest and most stable democracies in the developing world; Indonesia has been a functioning democracy since 1998; Malaysia is normally viewed as a semi-democracy; and Sri Lanka was a democracy for three decades before unchecked majoritarianism undermined its democratic vibrancy in 1983 and led to a civil war. At this point, Sri Lanka is at best a semi-democracy: there is vigorous contestation between the two...
main political parties for the vote of the majority community, but the electoral participation of the principal minority community, the Tamils, is minimal (though the same cannot be said of other minority communities, especially the Moors). It is possible to develop some ideas, based on the experiences of these countries, about the role Islam plays in ethnocommunal conflict, especially in democratic or semi-democratic settings.

I shall present two kinds of conclusions toward the end of this essay: one about how civil society can moderate ethnic violence, and another about how the link between Islam and violence, often assumed to be axiomatic these days, is mediated, among other things, by the local relationships into which Muslim communities may be interwoven with others. The argument that violence is inherent to Islam is not sustainable.

**CLARIFYING TERMS**

To avoid possible confusion, two terms should first be clearly defined: civil society and ethnocommunal conflict. Different scholars understand the terms differently. How do I interpret them?

By civil society, I mean that space in our social life that is located between the state institutions on the one hand and families on the other, that allows people voluntarily to come together for a whole variety of public activities, and that is relatively independent of the state. Civil society is not a nonpolitical but a non-state space of collective life. Moreover, in its non-state functions, it can embrace both social and political activities. Soccer leagues, playing-card societies, and philately, music, and film clubs may be social, not political; but trade unions and political parties in multiparty systems (not in single-party systems) are primarily the latter, not the former, though in the process of playing their political roles, they may also provide social platforms for coming together. Both types of organizations are parts of civil society, so long as they are independent of the state.

Are “ethnocommunal conflict” and “ethnocommunal violence” the same, or should we draw a distinction between the two? On the whole, most of the existing literature has not distinguished ethnocommunal violence from ethnocommunal conflict. In any ethnically and religiously plural society, where freedom of expression is available, some ethnocommunal conflict is more or less inevitable.

The key issue is whether ethnocommunal conflict (ethnic or communal conflict henceforth) is violent, or nonviolent, and waged in the institutionalized channels of the polity. If ethnic grievances are expressed in the recognized institutions of the polity—in parliaments, in assemblies, in bureaucracies—and ameliorative action is sought there, or alternatively, if it takes the form of nonviolent demonstrations on the streets, civil disobedience being the zenith of such politics, it is conflict to be sure, but not violence. Such institutionalized conflict, which can be quite healthy for a polity in many ways, must not be equated with a situation in which protest becomes violent, riots take place, pogroms are initiated against some ethnic groups with connivance of state authorities, and, in its most extreme form, a civil war breaks out. Ethnocommunal peace should, for all practical purposes, be conceptualized as an institutionalized channeling and resolution of ethnic conflicts. It should be visualized as an absence of violence, not as an absence of conflict. We might perhaps live in a more peaceful world if we could eliminate ethnic and national conflicts from our midst, but a post-ethnic, post-national era does not seem be in the offing, at least in the short to medium run.

**THE PUZZLE**

Sooner or later, a puzzling empirical regularity confronts scholars of ethnic conflict. Despite ethnic diversity, some places—nations, regions, towns, villages—remain peaceful, whereas others with the same diversity experience frequent outbursts of violence. Similarly, some multiethnic societies, after maintaining a long record of peace, explode all at once. Variations across time and space have until recently not been a focus of inquiry in the field of ethnicity and nationalism. My book, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, dealt with variation across space; a new project, described later, deals primarily with variations across time.

To understand variations across space on Hindu-Muslim violence in India, my book examined all reported Hindu-Muslim riots in the country between 1950 and 1995. Two results were crucial. First, the share of villages
involved in communal rioting was remarkably small. Rural India, where
two out of three Indians still live, accounted for a mere 3.6 percent of all
deaths in communal violence in this period. Hindu-Muslim violence is
primarily an urban phenomenon. Secondly, within urban India, Hindu-
Muslim riots were highly locally concentrated. Eight cities—Ahmedabad,
Bombay, Aligarh, Hyderabad, Meerut, Baroda, Calcutta, and Delhi —
accounted for a hugely disproportionate share of communal violence in
the country: roughly half of all urban deaths and 45 percent of all deaths
in communal violence, urban as well as rural. As a group, however, these
eight cities represent less than a fifth of India’s urban population (and only
about 5–6 percent of the country’s total population). Eighty-two percent
of the urban population has not been “riot-prone.”

In other words, India’s Hindu-Muslim violence is city-specific. State
(and national) politics is best seen as providing the context within which
the local mechanisms linked with violence, or peace, get activated. To
explain communal violence, we must thoroughly investigate these local
mechanisms.

Are these patterns by any chance specific only to India? While in-
country patterns of rioting have not been systematically investigated for
many countries, what we do know suggests that Indian patterns are not
peculiar. In Indonesia, a mere fifteen districts (kabupaten), holding 6.5
percent of the country’s total population, accounted for 85.5 percent of all
deaths in group violence short of civil wars between 1990 and 2003. The
data that we have on racial violence in the United States in the twentieth
century and on Northern Ireland’s “disturbances” since the late 1960s also
show roughly similar larger patterns.

Ethnocummmunal violence tends to be highly locally or regionally con-
centrated, not evenly geographically spread in a country. Before ethnic
conflicts become civil wars, a countrywide breakdown of ethnic relations
is rare. We tend to form partial, or wrong, impressions of ethnic violence,
because violence is what attracts the attention of media, not the quiet con-
tinuation of routine life, or because we derive conclusions about ethnic
conflict in general from civil wars that are, however, only one, though the
deadliest, type of ethnic conflict. A lot of ethnic violence takes the form
of riots before civil wars break out, and short of civil wars, it is more
common to have pockets of violence surrounded by vast stretches of peace.

The principal difference between riots and civil wars is simply that even
as the state’s neutrality may be in doubt during riots, the state does not
suspend the principle of neutrality, nor does it become a combatant in
ethnic strife. During civil wars, the state drops the principle of neutrality
altogether and also becomes a combatant against a group challenging the
state. Riots and civil wars are thus very different phenomena.

THE DOMINANT EXPLANATORY TRADITIONS

Until recently, scholars had four major explanations for ethnocummmunal
violence. By the recent standards of scholarship, these explanations suffer
from several deficiencies, which I will briefly discuss at the end of this
section. The most important gap for my purposes here is the incapabil-
ity of these traditions to explain local concentrations of ethnocummmunal
violence, the key empirical finding reported above. Let us look at each
tradition in turn.

The first major explanation, by far the most popular in the journalistic
and popular circles, is also known as “primordialism.”6 It refers to “primor-
dial or ancient animosities” as a cause of contemporary conflict. The
animosities, lasting for centuries, are said to be based on differences of race,
religion, or culture. Conflicts result, for a rational calculus is overlapped
by the emotional ties of blood or by ancient hatreds. Though this view is
popular in journalism, few scholars today subscribe to the idea of ancient
animosities. To put it simply, they believe that most ethnic conflicts, if
not religious ones, are modern or that, even if one finds evidence of their
prevalence in premodern times, the meaning and scale of those conflicts
were very different. Modernity has not led to the disappearance of ethnic
or religious identities, as was widely assumed by scholars, intellectuals,
and politicians after the Second World War. Rather, it can be shown that
for a whole variety of reasons, modernity can activate ethnic or religious
conflict.

The second big tradition is known as “instrumentalism.” Its key propo-
sition is that ancient animosities are not the main issue; rather, the
political elite uses ethnicity for political or economic purposes, regardless
of whether the elite believes in ethnicity. Conflicts are a result of such
cynical instrumental manipulation. This view has not been able to resolve
a major puzzle: the elite may indeed gain power by mobilizing ethnic identity, without actually believing in it, but why should the masses follow the leaders, especially if the costs of participation are known to be high and may include imprisonment, injury, or death?7

The third tradition, more recent than the previous two, has come to be called “constructivism.” The principal proposition of constructivists is that our contemporary identities as Hindus or Muslims, as Jews or Christians, as Tibetans or Han Chinese are modern, not ancient. The claim is not that there were no Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Christians, Tibetans, and Han Chinese in premodern times. Rather, identities in premodern times tended on the whole to be face-to-face and operated on a small scale. Ordinary people rarely interacted beyond their local environments. Conflict, when it emerged, was managed locally, and identities were considerably flexible. Extra-local communities did not include “the people”; such larger communities consisted primarily of the ecclesiastical elite and the court-based aristocracy and nobility.8 Modernity changed the meaning of identities by bringing the masses into a larger, extra-local, framework of consciousness. It made identities and communities broader and more institutionalized. In what has become a classic constructivist argument, Linda Colley shows how shared Protestantism, opposition to France, and the benefits of empire managed to dissolve the bitter historical disputes between the Scots and the English and led to the construction of a British identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.9 And in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, one of the most influential texts on nationalism today, the emphasis is on how modern technology and a modern economic system—the printing press and capitalism, to be more precise—made it possible to have imaginations about large and popular communities, which overtook the premodern, extra-local, religious communities of the clergymen on the one hand and the aristocratic dynasties on the other.

The fourth big tradition goes by the name of “institutionalism.” Its central idea is that there are clearly identifiable connections between ethnic conflict (or peace) on the one hand and political institutions on the other. It matters whether multiethnic societies have consociational or majoritarian democracies, federal or unitary governments, single- or multimember constituencies, proportional representation versus a first-past-

the-post electoral system. Ethnic pluralism, it is argued, requires political institutions—forms and rules of power sharing, types of constituencies, varieties of voting systems, party systems—different from those that are appropriate for ethnically homogeneous, or at any rate, ethnically undivided, societies. An uncritical adoption of institutional forms, regardless of whether a society is marked by ethnic divisions, can be a serious cause of ethnic conflict. An institutional choice suited to the ethnic map of a society resolves, or at any rate mitigates, conflict.

Three major deficiencies of this literature, two conceptual, one empirical, are worthy of our attention.10 The conceptual deficiencies have to do with two new ideas—mechanisms and variations—that have driven the evolution of research in the last ten years.

In earlier times, scholars often used to leave theory building to a link between structural conditions and the rise of ethnic conflict or nationalism. Ernest Gellner is the best-known example of this tendency.11 He argued that the rise of industrial age required nationalism, as linguistic standardization became necessary for communication between citizens, and the rural masses moved to cities in search of industrial employment. Given the social science norms of the 1990s, this sort of reasoning is no longer viewed as sufficiently rigorous. The fact that industrialization requires nationalism does not mean that it would happen. Can need create its own fulfillment? Many needs go unrealized in history and politics. At the very least, an account of the organizations, movements, or leaders that would undertake the task of converting needs into actual outcomes is required.

The idea of variance, similarly, has made advances possible. Theorizing about ethnic violence used to be based on establishing commonalities across the many cases of violence (or sometimes based on an in-depth case study or two).12 By the mid-1990s, following the popularity of King, Kohn, and Verba, this came to be called “selection bias” and was deemed inadmissible for derivation of causality.13

Selection bias, it was later noted, was not entirely useless. It could, for example, undermine an existing theory, if the generalizations based on similar cases led to an argument opposed to the existing theoretical orthodoxy.14 But in and of its own, it was not enough to generate a new, empirically valid, causal theory.
However, given the purposes of this essay, the most important gap of the traditional literature lies elsewhere. These theories are unable to account for the local/geographical concentrations of ethnic violence. If the primordial, instrumental, and constructivist arguments, all pitched at a very general level, were true, why would there be such variations within countries? If national political institutions were decisive, why would there be intranational differences? Clearly, something locally specific is also involved which, when discovered and included, begins to explain variations with or without national-level explanations.

**DISCOVERING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

Following this reasoning, my book on India selected six cities—three riot-prone and three peaceful—and arranged them in three pairs. Each pair contained a city where communal violence was endemic and a city where it was rare or entirely absent. To ensure that we did not compare apples and oranges, roughly similar percentages of Hindus and Muslims in the city populations constituted the minimum control in each pair.¹⁵

The relationship between civil society and ethnocommunal violence emerged from this comparison. To be more specific, my argument was focused on the *inter*communal links (networks and organizations that integrate Hindus and Muslims), not *intra*communal links (networks and organizations that are all Hindu or all Muslim). In an evocative turn of phrase, Robert Putnam calls the former bridging social capital, and the latter bonding social capital.¹⁶

These networks can be further separated into two types: organizational and quotidian. I called the first *associational forms* of civic engagement, and the second, *everyday forms* of civic engagement. Business associations, professional organizations of doctors, lawyers, teachers and students, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, festival organizations, trade unions, and political parties are some of the examples of associational forms. Everyday forms of engagement cover routine interactions of life such as whether Hindu and Muslim families visit each other, eat together, jointly participate in festivals, and allow their children to play together in the neighborhood. Both forms of engagement, if robust, promote peace; and their absence or weakness opens up space for communal violence. Of the two, the associational forms turn out to be more robust than everyday engagement, especially when confronted with attempts by politicians to polarize ethnic communities. Vigorous associational life, if intercommunal, acts as a serious constraint upon the polarizing strategies of political elites.

Why should this be so? Two links connect civic life and ethnic conflict. First, prior and sustained contact between members of different communities allows communication between them to moderate tensions and preempt violence when such tensions arise due to riots in a nearby city or state; distant violence or desecration reported in the press or shown on television; rumors planted by politicians or groups in the city to arouse communal bitterness and passions; or provocative acts of communal mischief by the police, thugs, or youth. All of these can be equated with *sparks* that do not necessarily turn into *fires*. In cities of thick interaction between different communities, peace committees at the time of tension emerge from below in various neighborhoods; the local administration does not have to impose such committees on the entire city from above. Because of mutual consent and voluntary involvement, the former is a better protector of peace than the latter. Such highly decentralized tension-managing organizations kill rumors, remove misunderstandings, and often police neighborhoods. If prior communication across communities does not exist, such organizations do not organically emerge from below. They are typically imposed from above, and the committees from above do not work well because their politician members, though inducted for purposes of peace, are normally already committed to polarization and violence for the sake of electoral benefit. Their presence on peace committees is often merely symbolic.

Second, in cities that have associational integration as well, not just everyday integration, the foundations of peace become stronger. In such settings, even those politicians who would, in theory, benefit from ethnic polarization find it hard to engender ethnic cleavages, arouse widespread bitterness, and instigate violence. Without a nexus between politicians and criminals, big riots and killings are highly improbable. If unions, business associations, middle class associations of doctors and lawyers, film clubs of poorer classes, and at least some political parties are integrated, even an otherwise mighty politician-criminal nexus is normally unable to break existing intercommunal links. Everyday engagement in
the neighborhoods may not be able to stand up to the violence of gangs protected by powerful politicians, but unions, associations, and the integrated cadres of some political parties—those who unlike the polarizers are not interested in ethnic conflict—become bulwarks of peace in two ways: their local strength convinces those who would benefit from violence that engineering riots is beyond the realms of possibility, and even if violent cadres of polarizing parties and the thugs associated with them do try, they are prevented from instigating riots. Integrated organizations constitute a forbidding obstacle for even politically shielded gangs. When associational integration is available, the potential space of destructive and violent action simply shrinks.

Civic links across communities have remarkable local or regional variation. Depending on how different communities are distributed in local businesses, middle-class occupations, parties, and labor markets, they tend to differ from place to place. As a result, even when the same organization is able to create tensions and violence in one city or region, it is unable to do so in another city or region where civic engagement crosses communal lines. Local and regional variation in ethnic violence, its uneven geographical spread, can thus be a function of civic engagement, which tends to vary locally or regionally.

This argument is diagrammatically presented in figure 1. It builds upon the metaphor of "sparks" (small clashes, tensions, rumors) and "fires" (riots) to make the point about the role of civil society. Intercommunal ties between Hindus and Muslims, not intracommunal ties among the Hindus or among the Muslims, are a strong bulwark of communal peace.

If towns and cities were organized only along intra-Hindu or intra-Muslim lines, the odds of fires breaking out, given sparks, were very high. In Indian cities, bonding social capital was highly correlated with Hindu-Muslim violence, but bridging ties could put out sparks very effectively, not allowing them to disrupt the local equilibrium of peace. The local organs of the state—the police and administration—simply worked better at riot prevention in integrated cities.

Islamic or Hindu religiosity was not the principal reason for riots in Indian cities. Rise of religiosity was in evidence in both peaceful and violent cities, not simply in the latter. In facilitating or preventing riots, the type of civic linkage—bridging or bonding, integrated or segregated—mattered most.

EXTENDING THE TERRAIN: DO ISLAM AND VIOLENCE GO TOGETHER?

The purpose of my new project is to (a) extend the comparative terrain and seek a multinational and multi-city comparison, and (b) to examine change over time, concentrating on cities that used to be violent but have become peaceful and vice versa. I have selected cities from Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

In Sri Lanka, the Tamil-Sinhala riots are the object of study. I have chosen the cities of Colombo, Kandy, and Negombo. The first two had awful riots before 1983, Colombo more so than Kandy, but Negombo has always remained quiet. Moreover, none of the three cities has had riots since 1983, when a civil war began in the northern tip of the country. Since then, the armed forces of Sri Lanka and Tamil guerillas have killed one another in large numbers, but the Tamil and Sinhalese civilians have not. Interestingly, the customary sparks for riots—dead bodies of Sinhalese soldiers brought home to the south after ambushes up north; Tamil Tigers attacking the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, a sacred Buddhist site—have been present in both periods, before and after 1983. But such
provocations have been managed quite peacefully in all three cities after 1983, whereas they often led to violence before that.

In Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Ipoh are the cities chosen. The first two experienced serious Malay-Chinese riots in the pre-1969 period, and the third had very little violence. All three have had no Malay-Chinese riots since 1969. Malaysia has had Malay-Chinese peace for over three decades now, something no observer of Malaysian politics in the 1960s predicted.

Indonesia suffered a lot of violence in the 1950s and 1960s, but not on the Muslim-Christian axis. The violence was primarily anti-Chinese. Since the mid-1990s, Muslim-Christian violence has spread to various parts of the country. The study concentrates primarily on changing Muslim-Christian relations over time and, secondarily, on anti-Chinese violence. Six cities are examined: Ambon, Poso, and Solo (all violence-prone, the third one less so than the first two); and Manado, Palu, and Yogyakarta (all peaceful).

In what ways is Islam involved in these conflicts, if at all? It should first be noted that, even though Sri Lanka is about 7 percent Muslim, the main axis of conflict does not involve Muslims. The ethno-religious profile of Sri Lanka can be presented in four parts: (a) 74 percent of Sri Lanka is ethically Sinhalese, and 70 percent is religiously Buddhist; (b) 18 percent is ethnically Tamil and 15 percent religiously Hindu; (c) 7 percent is ethnically Moor and 7 percent religiously Muslim; and (d) 8 percent of the population is religiously Christian, consisting of several ethnicities. The primary clash is between (a) and (b). The Sinhalese, who are primarily Buddhist, and Tamils, who are primarily Hindu, have been locked in an internal political battle since the 1950s. The battle has periodically been violent and, since 1983, has taken the form of a civil war, which by most estimates has already killed over sixty thousand people.

Small Tamil-Muslim riots have taken place now and then, but Muslims in Sri Lanka have on the whole played a quiet role in politics. The Tamil Tigers, leading the civil war on the Tamil side, are Hindu by religious origin, not Muslim. Throughout the 1990s, suicide bombing became a hallmark of the politics of Tamil Tigers. Two heads of government, including one from India, and several major political figures have been killed by suicide bombers.

In Malaysia too, historically speaking, the principal cleavage has not involved Islam. The distribution of Malaysia's major ethno-religious groups is as follows: (a) the ethnic Malays and other "indigenous" people constitute over 60 percent of the population, nearly all of whom are Muslim; (b) the ethnic Chinese are 24 percent of the population, subscribing to several religious faiths, mainly Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity; and (c) the ethnic Indians are 8 percent, mostly Hindu (but also containing a proportion of Muslims). Since independence, (a) and (b) have formed the principal cleavage, viewed and experienced almost entirely in ethnic, not religious, terms. The biggest riots in Malaysia—between the Malay and Chinese in 1969—had no religious content whatsoever. Malays as an ethnic group, not as a Muslim religious group, clashed with the Chinese, always defined ethnically or racially in Malaysia.

Islam has emerged in Malaysian politics in a big way over the last two decades. With isolated exceptions, it has principally been an issue within the Malay community. It has taken the form of a political struggle between moderate Muslims, represented by the leading Malay political party, UMNO, and many of the more religious Muslims, represented by PAS. Establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia has often been an avowed goal of PAS, whereas starting in the early 1980s, when Islam arose as a force in Malaysian politics, UMNO has sought to combine patronage of Islamic institutions with modern economic policies, especially in trade and infrastructure. Since independence, UMNO has consistently ruled Malaysia at the federal center, though always in a coalition, whereas PAS has played an important role in only four out of thirteen states, all four at the northern end of the peninsula and all four having overwhelming Malay majorities (Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis). PAS has not been able to penetrate states beyond these.

Though UMNO has of late started losing its legitimacy, it has historically been associated with Malaysia's memorable rise from poverty in the 1960s to a middle-income country, one that has more or less banished poverty. It is still to be seen whether UMNO will lose power and a coalition of opposition parties, which might include PAS, will replace it before long.

What about Indonesia? Of late, Indonesia has been a focus of special attention in the international security and political circles. Islamic terrorist groups developed a foothold, Muslim-Christian relations became
turbulent in some parts of the country, and the evidence that some Islamic groups had been involved in rioting as well as suicide bombing was unquestionable. Indonesia is 88 percent Muslim, 8 percent Christian, 2 percent Hindu, and 1 percent Buddhist. Christians are not evenly spread, concentrated largely on the eastern islands like the Malukus and Sulawesi, which is also where the most gruesome Muslim-Christian rioting has taken place.

However, two important facts should be noted. First, as in India, collective violence is highly locally concentrated in Indonesia. As I have already reported, a mere fifteen districts (kabupaten), holding 6.5 percent of the country’s total population, accounted for 85.4 percent of all deaths in collective violence between 1990 and 2003. In most parts of the country, Muslims and Christians live peacefully together.

Second, while the Islamic terrorist networks of Indonesia have made international news, something much more important about Indonesian Islam remains buried in scholarly texts. NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiya have historically been, and still are, the two biggest Islamic organizations of Indonesia. The former has anywhere between 25 and 30 million members, and the latter 20 to 25 million. These organizations run schools, universities, hospitals, libraries, and hostels. A very large number of Indonesian Muslims pass through these institutions, not through the violent networks.

What are the ideologies of these organizations? Neither subscribes to violent politics. And neither endorsed the riots or the terrorist bombings. Indeed, NU, the biggest Muslim organization, does not want the state to be committed to Islam at all, saying Islam is a matter entirely for the personal realm. Abdurrahman Wahid, who was president of Indonesia between 1999 and 2001, also headed NU for a long time and has been its principal ideologue. He argues: “For me, an Islamic society in Indonesia is... treason against the constitution for it will make non-Muslims second class citizens.” In his view, propagated through the institutions of NU, Islam can flourish in Indonesia only in a nationalist and secular state that does not formally subscribe to Islam. A marriage of Islam and statecraft would militate against the authenticity and vigor of religious life.

Such organizations constitute the mainstream of Indonesian Islam. The violent networks are literally a fringe. The fringe might have acquired considerable firepower, but it has little popularity. It cannot match the hold that organizations like the NU and Muhammadiya have over Indonesian Muslims.

In short, in these countries, Islam, like the other religious systems of the world, is “multivocal,” not “univocal.” To equate Islam with violence is untenable.

**IS THE INDIAN HYPOTHESIS PORTABLE?**

It should be noted first of all that some of the early findings already parallel those from India. Indonesian data have already been summarized above. Ethnocommunal violence tends to be highly locally or regionally concentrated. This was as true when Suharto’s New Order violently ended in Indonesia in 1998 as it was in Malaysia in 1969, when the country experienced its worst riots since independence in 1957. In Sri Lanka, too, local concentrations were evident, whether in 1956 and 1958 or during 1977 to 1983, the worst phase of rioting on the island.

Does the Indian hypothesis—integrated civil society as a bulwark of peace—also work in other countries? Emerging materials suggest that we perhaps need an initial distinction in our theory between (a) multiethnic societies that have a history of segregated civic sites (unions, churches, schools, business associations, etc.)—for example, the United States, South Africa, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka—and (b) multiethnic societies where ethnic groups have led an intermixed civic life—for instance, India and Indonesia. Interethnic or intercommunal civic engagement may be a key vehicle of peace in the latter but, given the relative absence of common black-white civic sites in countries like the United States, there may not have been any space for interracial associational engagement historically, leading to puzzles about the precise mechanisms of peace in a different historical and social setting.

Indeed, if we think further about this distinction, it may actually be more accurate to say that some groups in a society may be historically segregated, not societies as a whole. In India, where political parties, unions, business associations, and voluntary agencies are by and large ethnocommunally quite mixed, segregation has historically marked relations between the “scheduled castes”—called Dalits in contemporary political
discourse—and the “upper castes.” Dalits were “untouchable” for centuries, and the upper castes ritually and socially “superior.” 24 Historically, there have been no associational sites where the upper castes and the “untouchables” could come together, unlike the relationship between Hindus and Muslims, who had common civic spaces in many parts of India. Similarly, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews could eventually find common civic sites in the United States, but blacks and whites on the whole could not.25

“Self-policing,” a mechanism of peace deductively proposed by Fearon and Laitin but yet to be empirically examined, may well be relevant to such segregated settings. 26 It means intraethnic, or intracommunal, policing of one’s own youth, who are typically the earliest to strike, or strike back, at other groups. If exercised by elders, by an ethnic association, or by civic organizations such as churches, intraethnic policing may lead to the same result that intercommunal engagement does in India.

Both of these hypotheses—interethnic civic engagement and intraethnic self-policing—are civil-society based. The third and fourth hypotheses, also being explored in the new multicountry project, concern the state. One must remain open to state-level mechanisms, especially (a) if a state develops capacities to intervene quickly and effectively as ethnic sparks emerge, preventing their transformation into fires, or (b) the state introduces public policies and implements them, bringing a sense of justice or fulfillment to an aggrieved community, reducing thereby the odds of the very emergence of sparks. It is hard to imagine that, in political life, sparks can fully be prevented, but the idea is worth exploring nonetheless.

These remarks, of course, should not be construed to mean that in times of ethnic conflict, the state plays only the two roles identified above. States in different parts of the world are known to have played two other kinds of roles. Sometimes states inflame riots, siding clearly with one of the two ethnic groups in contention; and at other times, they simply tolerate riots, taking very little action even as the embers of violence burn ferociously.27 Consider an example from India, though some other examples can also be given.28

In March and April of 2002, awful Hindu-Muslim violence took place in the Indian state of Gujarat. 29 From available accounts, it is clear that the state government not only made no attempt to stop the killings, but it also condoned them. 30 That the government “officially encouraged” anti-Muslim violence cannot be conclusively proved on the basis of the evidence provided by newspaper reports, though later research and inquiry commissions may well come to that definitive judgment. At this point, what is unquestionable is that the state actively condoned revenge killings instead of stopping them, which was constitutionally required.

The statements of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) most closely associated with the Gujarat state government were highly indicative. According to the chief of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Gujarat was “the first positive response of the Hindus to Muslim fundamentalism in 1,000 years.” 31 Organizations like the VHP believe that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government did exactly what was required: namely, allowing violent Hindu retaliation against the Muslims, including those who had nothing to do with the mob that originally appeared to have torched two cars of a train, carrying Hindu pilgrims, in the Gujarati town of Godhra, an event that started the rioting. From a liberal perspective as well as, more importantly, constitutional perspectives, it is not the job of the government, whatever its ideological persuasion, to stoke public anger against its own citizens or to allow the public to express itself violently, regardless of the provocation. No elected government that has taken an oath to protect lives of its citizens can behave the way criminal gangs do, thirsting for a tit-for-tat. But that is what happened. More than a thousand people died.

The state can, thus, play three distinct roles: riot-inhibiting, riot-tolerating, and riot-inflaming. Needless to add, it is when the state plays the first role, usually constitutionally required, that it directly contributes to ethnic peace, not otherwise.

EMERGING DIRECTIONS

Though the new project is not yet completed, the city-level evidence from it has started coming in. Some materials clearly go in the direction of the Indian hypothesis; others do not. To illustrate this divergence, I will briefly summarize Sri Lankan materials first, and then concentrate at greater length on the emerging Malaysian results.

As I have already noted, of the three Sri Lankan cities, Colombo,
Kandy, and Negombo, the last has never had Tamil-Sinhala rioting. Negombo is a mere hour and a quarter away from the heart of Colombo city, where rioting during 1956, 1958, and 1977–83 was frequent. In 1983, riots in Colombo, with the involvement of the state, took the form of gruesome pogroms, touching off violence in many parts of the island. Even at that time, Negombo experienced some arson, but no riots.

Interviews make it clear that Negombo is exceptionally ethnically integrated. The most striking local institution is the Catholic Church. Like elsewhere in Sri Lanka, the Tamils and Sinhalese are ethnically distinct in Negombo, but unlike elsewhere, most Tamils and Sinhalese in that town share the Catholic faith. The Church brings the two ethnic groups together and has historically provided bridging social capital, which has developed enduring, organic roots. Moreover, there also exist a whole array of integrated organizations—business, labor, middle class—in the town. Negombo thus supports the Indian hypothesis about the role of civic integration in promoting ethnic peace. Unfortunately, it is one of very few towns where such integration between the two leading ethnic communities exists. Most Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka are Hindu and Buddhist respectively, not Christian. On the whole, religion does not play a bridging role in Sri Lanka, and other aspects of social life of the masses also do not.

The city-level results from Malaysia are also striking. While it is not yet unambiguously clear what explains Malay-Chinese peace since 1969, it is already obvious that the Indian hypothesis—civic integration as a foundation of ethnic peace—is not applicable. The Malay and the Chinese in Malaysia continue to be highly segregated, both in everyday life and in organizations.

To put the matter in perspective, let us compare the city of Kuala Lumpur (KL), the site of Malaysia’s worst Malay-Chinese riots in 1969 but enjoying Malay-Chinese peace ever since, with Calicut, one of the peaceful cities in the Indian study. In Calicut, the mass survey was conducted in 1995, and in KL, in 2005. The sampling methodologies were roughly similar.

Whereas nearly 83 percent of sampled Hindus and Muslims in Calicut reported “eating together often,” in KL that proportion is 1.8 percent, and if added to “eating together sometimes,” the total is only 8 percent. Nearly 90 percent of the Calicut sample had reported that Hindu and Muslim children played together in the neighborhood, the proportion in KL is 15 percent. About 85 percent of Calicut Hindus and Muslims visited each other socially; only 20 percent of the KL Malay and Chinese reported doing so.

In Calicut, a huge proportion of associations and civic organizations—for businessmen, labor, middle-class professionals—were integrated. In KL, only 3 percent of the sample said that the business organizations they had joined were mixed; only 2 percent reported being in mixed labor organizations; a mere 2.3 percent were in mixed middle-class professional organizations; and finally, only 1.8 percent, 5.7 percent, and 1.4 percent, respectively, said that the NGOs, party organizations, and neighborhood associations in which they had participated were mixed.

In short, both in quotidian and organizational life, KL is a highly segregated city. Two more points should be noted. KL is Malaysia’s most cosmopolitan city. If anything, the prediction is that the eventual statistics will show an even lower level of integration in the two other Malaysian cities selected for the project.

Second, the current trends in group interaction are quite consistent with historical patterns. Early in the twentieth century, Furnivall had described Malay society as a place where different ethnic groups lived mostly separately, at best meeting in the marketplace for buying and selling. A careful study published in the 1970s had also concluded that “despite considerable changes in the city’s ethnic composition, segregation of racial groups continues,” the few upper-class neighborhoods of KL being the only exception.31

Despite remarkably little integration, Malay-Chinese peace in KL since 1969 has had its longest run for over a century. Most observers argue that it is the capacity of the state to nip tensions in the bud, or its policy performance, that accounts for the long peace.49 Further research will show whether this explanation is correct.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that the government of Malaysia does not think state-level measures alone can continue to ensure peace, even if they have by now. Considering Malaysia’s racial peace fragile, the gov-
ernment has launched a new drive aimed at societal integration. Rukun Tetangga, neighborhood-level committees, are the principal organizational vehicle for the drive. Expecting that they will bring the three races—the Malays, the Chinese, the Indians—together in everyday life, the government aims to cover the entire country with such committees over time. Presumably, once put in place by government, they will acquire a life of their own. According to a 2003 article in the Straits Times:

National Unity Department director general Abdul Rashid Sahad said racial polarization in the workplace is becoming a worrying trend in the country. He said the tendency of workers to stick within their own community is gradually infiltrating workplaces, which is unhealthy for a multi-racial country like Malaysia.

In an effort to achieve “zero racial conflict” this year, the department has approved grants for Rukun Tetangga and public education programs, particularly those targeting the urban population, on the sensitivities of various races. Rukun Tetangga (RT) is a neighborhood watch group run by residents in housing estates to combat crimes and to promote racial integration. Abdul Rashid said the government hopes to set up 3,000 RTs to serve 7.5 million people by the end of the year, and eventually increase this to 4,800 for 12 million people by 2010.35

If such anxieties can emerge in a semi-democracy like Malaysia, which can deploy a lot of coercion in handling ethnocommunal relations, bridging social capital, especially of the organizational kind, should be considered even more important for ethnic peace in multiethnic democracies. Democracies do not easily get the option of regulating group relations by state diktat. In 1971, Malaysia could, by force, make affirmative action pro-Malay majority and could outlaw any discussion of it. Other ethnic groups simply had to accept the new rules favoring the Malays, whether they agreed or not. Such decisions often lead to serious, even violent, contention in democracies. Open discussion on policy can not normally be outlawed in democracies. Even Malaysia is beginning to feel the heat of late.

CAN THE STATE HELP THE EMERGENCE OF INTEGRATED CIVIL SOCIETIES?

It is often suggested that civil society, being a non-state sphere of collective life, depends entirely on citizen initiatives and is not something that the state either can build or should try to. Case evidence suggests that the story is more complicated and that the state can play a positive role. Consider an example.

Bhiwandi, a town just outside Bombay, India, was infamous for Hindu-Muslim riots in the 1970s and 1980s in which nearly two hundred lives were lost. The turning point was the arrival in June 1988 of a police chief for three years. In those three years, Bhiwandi was transformed from a town notorious for its capacity for rioting to one that could meticulously work for, and keep, communal peace, even in the worst of times, as it did between 1988 and 1993 and again in 2002. The key was building Hindu-Muslim contacts in an organized way and around common issues of concern. Peace has prevailed since 1988.

The town of Bhiwandi is a rather unlikely site for healthy and robust civic engagement. A center of small textile industry, most of which exists in the informal sector, Bhiwandi is full of “sprawling hutment colonies, narrow streets, the never-ceasing rattling of powerrooms,” and “the town’s civic amenities are bursting at the seams under the increasing demands of the shanties mushrooming all round.”36 Hindus and Muslims tend to live in segregated neighborhoods.

Undeterred by this setting and the town’s history of violence, the police chief argued that instead of fighting the fires when they broke out, it was better for the police to bring Hindus and Muslims together to create mutual understanding. The aim was to set up durable structures of peace. If the Hindus and Muslims could meet each other often enough and discuss common problems, a reservoir of communication and perhaps trust would be created, which in turn would play a peacemaking role at the time of communal tensions. Thinking that “to be forewarned is to be forearmed,”37 the police chief decided to put together neighborhood committees (mohalla samitis) for the whole town under his supervision.

Since segregated living was the norm in the town, each committee covered two neighborhoods and consisted of an equal number of Hindus
and Muslims, selected on the basis of local knowledge. The committee members were those who "wielded considerable influence in their respective neighborhoods (mohallas) and had a clean record." Special care was taken to ensure that "no communist or known criminal," lacking a "genuine desire for peace," was selected. For every two or three committees, one police officer was appointed to act as liaison officer. Wherever available, the committee members included highly respected professionals, like doctors and lawyers. But in the poorest neighborhoods, where no such professionals were present, the committees consisted of "coollies and even housewives." Whether professionals, coolies, or housewives, the only condition for committee members was that they be respected by their neighbors for probity and goodwill, for which local knowledge was used, and have no criminal records, for which police data was consulted.

Seventy such committees were created to cover the entire town. They would discuss "matters of mutual concern." They would meet as and when necessary, typically at least once a week but daily in times of tension, with a police officer presiding. And as time wore on, they turned out to be so successful that even nonmembers started attending important meetings, thus broadening "the base of mutual confidence."

During 1988–92, the nationwide mobilization, sponsored by the Hindu nationalists, for the destruction of the Baburi mosque was at its peak. As a consequence, communal tensions in much of India were high, and there were many moments of tension and bitterness in Bhiwandi as well. But "when passions ran high . . . , members on both sides came together and voluntarily undertook the task of patrolling the streets for nights on end. Rumors were suppressed on the spot and rumor-mongers handed over to the police . . . [As a result], the evil-doers preferred to lie low, . . . [and] were totally isolated by the constant vigilance against them by committee members." Not a single life was lost.

In 2002, the neighboring state of Gujarat had brutal anti-Muslim riots. As the Gujarat riots raged, the head of a rather extreme Hindu nationalist organization, Bajrang Dal, was murdered in the town of Bhiwandi. The suspicion was that Muslims had attacked him to avenge the killings of Muslims by Hindu nationalist mobs in Gujarat. Again, tensions emerged, but only to subside. No riots broke out in Bhiwandi.

What should one conclude from this example? The Bhiwandi experi-

ment, in particular, questions the idea, widely held in some circles, that there is an adversarial relationship between the state and civil society. Civil society is a non-state, not an anti-state, space of our life, whose vigor can be, though is not necessarily, promoted by the state. Civil society is typically anti-state when the state, by design or unintended consequence, begins to undermine civic life, not if it does not. Because civic linkages were forged on the initiative of the local organ of the state, the Bhiwandi experiment suggests fruitful possibilities of a state–civil society synergy for stemming endemic violence. With a strong civic edifice in place, the state can prevent riots with considerable ease. Organizationally integrated towns are simply easier to police in times of communal tensions, as helpful information travels quickly from civil society to local state organs and the two work synergistically. Sparks are put out before they become fires. Some other towns have of late followed the Bhiwandi model of neighborhood committees, reporting considerable success.41

Of course, the fact that the state in Bhiwandi facilitated and nurtured autonomous civil society organizations does not mean that states usually do so. Twentieth-century Latin American history is full of examples of corporatist organizations—business associations, workers unions, peasant organizations—created by the state primarily to serve the state's ends.42 Corporatist structures do not allow autonomy from the state, the hallmark of a true civil society.

In short, while the state can indeed aid the evolution of civil society organizations, the Bhiwandi example should not be viewed as a normal course of state action in the developing world. Typically, organization creation of this kind requires a democratic polity. Authoritarian polities tend not to encourage autonomous civil society organizations, even if they want ethnic integration. Yugoslavia under Tito is known to have favored ethnic integration, but even as the softest Communist state, it did not allow organizations autonomous of the state.43

I have made two related arguments in this essay. First, ethnic integration in civic life, especially in organizations, is a most promising, if not the only, foundation of ethnic peace, a point not recognized in the literature until recently. Even when it is believed that the government can pro-
Managing Potential Cultural Conflicts Democratically

cure peace through administrative or policy measures, as in Malaysia, there are doubts, even in government quarters, that such peace may not last without civic integration. There are, of course, other ways to peace in multiethnic societies. The consociational experiments in Europe are diametrically opposed to my arguments about integrated civil societies. But as the vast literature on consociationalism shows, consociation experiments require certain preconditions for success; they are not generalizable. My arguments here also should not be construed to imply that integrated civil societies are either always available or can be easily created. But once created and institutionalized, their implications for peace should be obvious.

Second, my argument about Islam is a specific version of the larger argument above. It is often argued, or assumed, that Islam as a religion has an integral relationship with communal violence. In the countries covered by my research, this argument does not hold. Whether Muslims are involved in large-scale violence is not a function of Islamic religiosity per se but of the kinds of links built between them and the other communities.

Debating Secession Peacefully and Democratically
The Case of Canada

RICHARD SIMEON

Studies of democratic breakdown or ethnic conflict tend naturally to focus on cases of failure and ask why. This chapter asks whether there may be lessons for others in the case of success. The case is Canada.

This is not to suggest that Canadian democracy represents some sort of ideal state. Canadians vigorously debate their "democratic deficit," focused on issues such as a first-past-the-post electoral system that seriously distorts the relationship between seats and votes and exaggerates regional differences, a Westminster-based parliamentary system that puts too much power in the hands of the prime minister, a system of intergovernmental relations that too often excludes the public, and so on. Canadians also worry about declining electoral turnout and citizen engagement, especially among younger citizens. This chapter focuses on one thing that Canada does appear to have done especially well: the accommodation and management of difference.

Canadian democracy faces the task of managing three distinct dimensions of "deep diversity." The first and most important, in the simple sense that only it has the potential of breaking the Canadian union, is language. Canada is a binational federation. French-speaking Canadians make up about a quarter of the population; they are heavily concentrated in Canada's second largest province, Quebec, where they constitute more than four-fifths of the population. Quebecers have a strong sense of
liament still had powers to dissolve the Parliament and call elections in order to try to get a majority. Within months this had actually happened in Portugal.

Steven D. Roper, on his combined score of presidential powers, gives France a 5, Slovenia less, at 3, and Lithuania a 1. See his "Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes," Comparative Politics 34 (April 2002): 253–72.

**Chapter 1: Civil Society, Islam, and Ethnocommunal Conflict**

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Club of Madrid general assembly, November 2004. I am grateful to conference participants, an anonymous reader, and Alfred Stepan for their comments on two earlier drafts.

1. While research on the last three countries is currently under way, my work on Hindu-Muslim relations in India is already published: Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002). Wherever the discussion in this chapter focuses on India, I will rely heavily on my book.

2. In single-party systems, political parties are appendages of the state and cannot easily perform civil society functions. In multiparty polities, ruling parties may become part of the state institutions but opposition parties do not, which allows them to be important players in the non-state realm of public activities.

3. The data set was put together in collaboration with Steven Wilkinson (University of Chicago).


10. For a fuller discussion of these gaps, see Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).


12. For example, the arguments about conflict in Horowitz were based on the commonalities principle. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In his more recent work, Horowitz has taken note of variance and dealt with it. See Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), chap. 12.


14. For details, see the following exchange between Varshney and Laitin: Ashutosh Varshney, “Recognizing the Tradeoffs We Make,” and David Laitin, “Ethnography and/or Rational Choice,” both in Qualitative Methods 4, no. 1 (Spring 2006).

15. The cities were Aligarh, Calicut, Hyderabad, Lucknow, and Ahmedabad and Surat.


17. Whether custody rights should be determined on the basis of the shari`at or civil law if the husband converted to Islam from Hinduism just before filing for divorce was a much discussed and contentious issue in Malay-Indian relations in 2007.

18. For an analysis of how this battle has evolved in favor of moderate Muslims in Malaysia, whereas it went in the direction of extremism in Pakistan, see S. Val Reza Nasr, The Islamic Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).


22. Cited in ibid., 64.


24. For a remarkable first-person account, see Narendra Jadhav, Untouchables: My Family’s Triumphant Journey out of the Caste System in Modern India (New York: Scribner, 2005).


27. The awful riots in Gujarat state in 1969 are an example of such behavior. See Varshney, Ethnic Conflict, chaps. 10 and 11.


29. For further details, see Ashutosh Varshney, “Understanding Gujarat Violence,” Items and Issues, Newsletter of the Social Science Research Council, New York (Fall 2002).

30. This is based on a close reading of the following newspapers: the Times of India; the Indian Express; and the Hindustan Times.


32. There was a Malay-Indian riot, however, in 1998.


35. “Workers of the Same Race Stick Together,” Straits Times, February 1, 2003. Given the rising Malay-Indian tensions in Malaysia, it is not clear how well this policy has been implemented or is working.


37. Ibid., 115.

38. The citations in this paragraph are from ibid., 116.

39. Both citations in this paragraph from ibid., 118.

40. Ibid., 119.


CHAPTER 2: DEBATING Secession Peacefully AND DEMOCRATICALLY

1. These issues are fully explored in a series of short monographs, The Canadian Democratic Audit, published by the University of British Columbia Press under the editorship of William Cross.


3. And indeed, since the British conquest of New France a century earlier, the British permitted the Canadiens to maintain their language, Roman Catholic religion, and system of civil law.

4. For a thorough analysis of these three dimensions of diversity, see Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).


6. For a full discussion of the federal position in this debate, and an exchange of correspondence between Stéphane Dion, the federal minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and Lucien Bouchard, the PQ premier of Quebec, see Dion, ed, Straight Talk: Speeches and Writings on Canadian Unity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999).


8. For comment on the judgment see David Schneiderman, ed., The Quebec Decision: Perspective on the Supreme Court Ruling on Secession (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1999).


10. See Keith C. Banting, Roger Gibbins, Peter M. Leslie, Alain Noel,