

Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem

Ashutosh Varshney

Ashutosh Varshney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.¹ His research and teaching are in the areas of South Asian Politics and the Political Economy of Development. His articles have appeared in *Asian Survey*, *The Journal of Development Studies*, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *Policy Sciences*, and *Economic and Political Weekly*. His book entitled, *The Myth of Rural Powerlessness: Town-Country Struggles in India's Development* will be published by Cambridge University Press in 1993. Currently he is working on a research project entitled "Muslims in Indian Polity." This article was written following field research undertaken in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu during the insurgency in 1990. A native of Uttar Pradesh, he was educated at the University of Allahabad, Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he received his doctorate in Political Science in 1990.

The Larger Context

Ethnic, religious and nationalist passions have returned to the agenda of world politics. The hope of intellectuals and statesmen at the turn of the 1950s was that a rising tide of rationality and modernization, in both its liberal and Marxist variants, would sweep away the ascriptive identities of religion, ethnicity and nation--identities which had led to such violence, bloodshed and ruin. The expected erosion, however, did not take place. Rather, their persistence began increasingly to be seen as a possibility by social scientists in the 1970s.²

These correctives were well-taken, but it would be fair to say that ethnic and religious passions have gone beyond all expectations in the 1980s. Several societies seem to be on the verge of ethnic disintegration, though that may not eventually happen, depending on how politics and institutions are restructured. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are, of course, the most dramatic examples. Serious ethnic assertion also marks most of Eastern Europe, the Middle-East and South Asia.³

Why are so many people in the world defining themselves in ethnic and religious ways, not in pragmatic and rational terms? The problem is poorly understood. It is troubling for two kinds of contrasting orthodoxies--less obviously for an emerging body of literature influenced by what has come to be known as post-modernism, more obviously for the rational choice theorists. Partially (and uncannily) resembling the arguments made by positivist social scientists against modernization theory, post-modernists argue that modernity, by threatening to denude human beings of their roots, sets off an ascriptive reaction.⁴ Ascription thus is inherent in the "project of modernity"--an umbrella term for rationality (of science, technology and economics), secularism and the nation-state, all of which, according to post-modernists, tend to eat into the intrinsic and meaningful cultural and political differences between groups and individuals, and seek to flatten them in the image of dominant groups and cultures.

On the face of it, an ethnic resurgence would seem to support this view. The trouble, however, is that not everywhere has modernity led to an ascriptive revival. A Muslim Turkey comfortably co-exists with modernism, but Iran went through an Islamic revolution. Partly dependent on the state of politics and on political institutions, societies seem to show varying propensities towards modernity. The post-modern way of grand theorizing seems to need the fine grains of its methodological adversary, viz. positivism.

Rationalists have also suffered. Believing so far that human beings *everywhere* act in rational and instrumental ways, several thoughtful and influential scholars of the "rational choice" school, have also begun seriously to question their postulates.⁵ Literature on ethnicity, religion and nationalism has once again begun to grow.⁶ A good deal of

scholarship in the coming decade will be trying to make sense of what is new, and what is old and familiar, in the current ethnic and religious revival.

Though not fully understood, some minimal comparative observations can nonetheless be offered on the ethnic and nationalist revival of today. It is marked by at least four factors--two old, two relatively new. First, several ethnic groups, though not all, cut across international boundaries constructed to represent juridical statehood or are spread across regional boundaries within a nation-state. Groups spread this way (Kurds, Tamils, Muslims in South Asia, Sikhs, several nationalities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) seem to be demonstrating the most virulent form of nationalism, or are objects of a terrible nationalist repression. Second, partisan intellectuals and leaders are reconstructing national histories with a litany of inter-ethnic charges, with tales of broken promises or stories of ethnic ingratitude. Through what has come to be known as the mode of selective retrieval, tales of betrayal are threatening to push out a shared heritage of communal coexistence from collective memories. Hindu nationalists recall Babar and Aurangzeb, the intolerant Moghul rulers, not Akbar, the tolerant one. Sikh militants point to the betrayal of Hindus in 1951 when they gave up their mother tongue, Punjabi; few refer to the fact that until the late 19th century, it was common for two siblings in the same family to be a Sikh and a Hindu. Sinhala nationalists speak of how Tamils corrupted their original Buddhist land; centuries of Sri Lankan history are, however, full of Sinhala-Tamil co-existence.

Giving marked virulence to these traditional attributes of ethnic struggle are two new factors. Weapons of deadly potential are plentifully available in many parts of the world, making ethnicity--and the response to it--violent and brutal in unprecedented ways. Kalashnikov-wielding partisans are clearly not the same as men using stones, spears and primitive guns. Spraying 30 bullets from one magazine, a (second-hand) Kalashnikov AK-47 can easily be picked up for \$50 in the black markets of Pakistan, for \$75 in Honduras, for \$80 in Thailand.⁷ The violence accompanying ethnic conflicts today raises serious concerns of civil rights in some circles but equally serious considerations of order and national integrity in the decision-making realms.

Finally, the spread of information technology--television and videos--is imparting a new emotional intensity. To see one's own community on an insurgent path or to watch the security forces roll the insurgency back on one's television screen is not the same as reading or hearing about it. Kashmiri militants show video films of the para-military crackdown; Hindu nationalists film the police firing on the masses trying to "liberate" Lord Ram's birthplace, which they then release commercially. The demonstration effect of religious or ethnic assertion elsewhere in the world can also be quite dramatic. Not only can the victory of Mujahids in

Afghanistan produce a new resolve in the Valley of Kashmir, or a religious revolution in Iran embolden Islamic militants, as one may expect; even something as distant as the fall of Romania's dictator shown on national television, or struggle conducted in faraway lands against Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* can be a source of inspiration, invigoration and ethnic resolve. With today's technology, "imagined communities," to borrow Benedict Anderson's evocative phrase, have come to exist more easily than before, and with greater intensity.

Going back to the partition of India in 1947, the Kashmir problem, as this paper will show, shares these properties of the new ethnicity. It is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan, enemies since the partition of 1947. At this point, one-third of the original state of Jammu and Kashmir is with Pakistan and two-thirds with India. Kashmir has twice in the past led India and Pakistan to war, in 1947 and in 1965. An armed insurgency in 1990 brought the two traditional foes very close to a war. As a matter of fact, most Indian, if not Pakistani, observers would argue that a low-intensity war has been under way for over a year in the Kashmir Valley.

Moreover, events have come full circle in Kashmir. In August 1947, the argument of mainstream Muslim leaders, that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, led to the birth of Pakistan. But Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, refused to join Pakistan. In October 1947, peeved at the Kashmiri rejection of Pakistan, and following Hindu-Muslim violence in Poonch district at the border, thousands of well-armed Pathan tribals from Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) decided to "liberate" Kashmir by force.⁸ Facing military defeat and therefore seeking support of the Indian army to save his embattled princely state, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed a treaty of accession with India. India accepted the accession but added a proviso: that it would be submitted to a popular referendum later since only the people, not the Maharaja, could decide where Kashmiris wanted to live. It was a provisional accession. The National Conference, the most popular political organization in Kashmir, supported the Maharaja's decision to accede to India. India's army pushed the invaders back. Three and a half months later in February 1948, Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmir's eminent political leader for almost half a century (1931-82), head of the National Conference and a Muslim himself, made a long and impassioned speech in the Security Council. Some extracts deserve close attention:

When the (Pakistani) raiders came to our land, massacred thousands of people—mostly Hindus, Sikhs but Muslims too—abducted thousands of girls..., looted our property and almost reached the gates of our summer capital, Sri Nagar, the result was that the civil, military and police administration failed. ...In that hour of crisis, the National Conference came

forward with its 10,000 volunteers.... They started guarding the banks, the offices and houses of every person in the capital.

It is absolutely impossible for the tribesmen to enter our territory without encouragement from Pakistan.... Hundreds of trucks, thousands of gallons of petrol, thousands of rifles, ammunition...were supplied to them.

I had thought all along that the world had got rid of the Hitlers..., but from what is happening in my poor country, I am convinced they have transmigrated their souls into Pakistan.

the (plebiscite) offer (was) made by the Prime Minister of India when, I think, he had not the slightest need for making it, for Kashmir was in distress....The Government of India could have easily accepted the accession and said, "All right, we accept your accession and we shall render this help." There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add the proviso while accepting the accession that "India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir." I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir; I refuse this point blank....We have seen enough of Pakistan. The people of Kashmir have seen enough.⁹

These were strong words. Disapproval of Pakistan and gratitude towards India could not have been more unequivocal.

Four decades later, equations in Kashmir have changed drastically. To India's embarrassment, Kashmiris are now fighting India's security forces, not Pakistan-backed invaders. For the first time since 1947, an armed insurgency has erupted in the Kashmir Valley. In a place known for its quietistic, syncretistic Islam, militant Islamic fundamentalism has acquired a foothold. A Valley so exquisite in its beauty as to be "almost above human desire,"¹⁰ has of late been burning, its beauty charred by a savage destruction of life and property. The fire of nationalism, ethnicity and religion has consumed more than 2,000 lives.

This paper deals with two sets of issues about Kashmir. First, why do India and Pakistan always fight over Kashmir? What do they want and why can't they understand that the Kashmiris, both Hindus and Muslims, are grievously suffering? Secondly, what explains the transformation in Kashmir—from 1947 (and again in 1965) when the Indian Army and Kashmiris jointly fought Pakistan to now, when Kashmiris are fighting the Indian armed forces? Section I is conceptual. It identifies the basic ingredients of the Kashmir problem. Section II is empirical. It presents the historical narrative. Kashmir's agony is best seen as a tragedy; it has not resulted from a wanton evil act perpetrated by any one actor in a sad drama. Moreover, there exists a potential for an even greater tragedy. Statesmanship is badly required to ensure that Kashmir's tragedy is

resolved before it becomes much worse. The logic of a compromise between India and Pakistan is proposed in the Concluding Section.

Antinomies of Nationalism: Secular, Religious and Ethnic

The Argument

At its core, the Kashmir problem is a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomized by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris call *Kashmiriat* (being a Kashmiri). Internal inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes mark all three. Briefly summed up first, the antinomies are discussed in detail later.

Pakistan was founded on religious nationalism. Being a Muslim majority state, Kashmir, Pakistan believed, should have come to it at the time of partition. However, Pakistan faced two problems, one conjunctural, the other structural. First, Pakistan's founder, M.A. Jinnah, had argued that the rulers of the princely states, not the masses ruled by them, would decide which of the two new nation-states, India or Pakistan, they would join. However, neither the Maharaja of Kashmir nor, for that matter, Kashmir's most popular organization (that, among other things, was fighting the Maharaja's rule) elected to go to Pakistan. Second, 65 million Muslims joined Pakistan in 1947, but 35 million were left behind. This number has grown to be almost 110 million by now, whereas the number of Muslims in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a mere 4 million. Pakistan's continued search for Kashmir, thus, runs into the following contradiction: If it tries to liberate Kashmir, or if Kashmir breaks away with its help, Pakistan runs the risk of endangering the welfare of the remaining 105 million Muslims in India. If political and civil rights were always viewed as *individual* rights, a Muslim outside Kashmir would not be, and should not be, affected by the actions of Kashmiri Muslims.

Unfortunately, rights are also viewed by the populace as *group entitlements*, not only in India but also elsewhere. Japanese Americans on the West Coast of the U.S. were implicated in the actions of Japan during the Second World War and Arab Americans found themselves caught in an unfortunate corner during the recent Gulf War. Willynilly, because of the way Pakistan was carved out of India to represent a Muslim homeland, Indian Muslims became implicated in Pakistan's actions, particularly in Kashmir where the Indo-Pak contest has been the greatest. If popular perceptions matched the liberal notion of rights, that would not be true. An inevitable nationalist cry, however, is: how many times will India be partitioned due to the so-called Muslim Question? Muslims of pre-1947 India already have two homelands, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Would

Kashmir be a third? Ultimately, the break-up of nation-states, one may say, is not a rational question. Reason collapses on the bedrock of emotions. Nation-states become *embodied*; to several people, their break-up therefore feels like a limb tearing apart. It is painful for those who experience the nation in their bodies. And, rightly or wrongly, so many feel the nation that way.

Led by the Congress party, India's national movement contested religious nationalism, claiming that Muslims were as much citizens of India as the Hindus. The secular nationalism of the Congress not only faced an ideological adversary in Muslim nationalism but also an intra-party rival in Hindu nationalism, fed as the latter was by a belief in "Muslim disloyalty" to India. The Hindu nationalist faction could not win the battle for state formation. However, this faction and its allies in the opposition, represented after independence by a separate party, the erstwhile Jan Sangh or what is today the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have always lurked in the background, waiting for their opportunity to take control of the Indian state. The voluntary decision of a Muslim-majority Kashmir, however provisional, to join India bolstered the secular argument. Once part of India, Kashmir's decision to break away, if taken or if successful, threatens to *empower* Hindu nationalism. For it legitimates its main argument: that Muslims are essentially disloyal to the country. The inevitable cry again is: How many times would India be divided because of the Muslim Question?

Therefore, in order to maintain its secularism and keep Hindu nationalism at bay, Kashmir, according to the secularists, must stay in India--if necessary, by force. Moreover, and this is the second contradiction, India's secular nationalism functions in a liberal democratic framework. Commitment to liberal principles was the reason Nehru offered plebiscite to Kashmiris as a method of confirming a provisional accession. But nationalism soon defined the limits of liberalism. If liberalism means freedom to organize and speak, does it also mean freedom to secede? Essentially, liberalism has no way of resolving this problem which will not damage it at the same time. If it does not let people secede, even where there is a demand for secession, it means people in the disputed area are not free to choose their rulers. If it concedes freedom to secede, it becomes a lofty but bloodless principle for people outside the area of secession. Human beings are not simply disembodied individuals but also people attached to a land, to a history, to national pride. What good is liberalism if it can't even protect the national boundaries and national integrity due to the freedoms it offers? There is no escape from this question. A liberal democracy functions well when a nation has already been constructed.¹¹ A civil war preceded the success of political liberalism in the United States. Kashmir exemplifies the helplessness of liberalism against nationalism.

Kashmiri nationalism has run into two objections about its consistency. First, if Kashmir's leaders did not choose Pakistan despite religious affinity but opted to stay with India on grounds of secularism, shouldn't it also mean that Kashmiri nationalism is a *subset* of Indian nationalism and therefore Kashmir, with state level autonomy, part of the Indian federation? What justification might there be for an independent Kashmir except bad faith and opportunism (Kashmir, after all, was saved from Pakistan's occupation by India's army in 1947-48 and 1965)? It may have been rational to use India's might to deal with Pakistan *while not telling India about the true intentions*, but the rationality of this calculation may be viewed as an emotionally unacceptable duplicity. Could Kashmir be both rational and generate trust in Delhi? On the other hand, and this is the second problem, if the argument is that Kashmiri nationalism is incompatible with Indian nationalism, then how can two other ethnically different parts of the Kashmir state go with Kashmir? What is generally called the state of Kashmir happens to be the state Jammu and Kashmir (J&K hereafter). The J&K State has three ethnically separable geographical regions--a Dogra Hindu-Majority Jammu, a Muslim-majority Kashmir and a Tibetan Buddhist-majority Ladakh. If Kashmiri nationalism is not based on *religion* but on *Kashmiriat*, a separate Kashmiri *ethnicity*, then it has to be realized that the Buddhists in Ladakh and Hindus of Jammu are ethnically Tibetans and Dogras respectively, not Kashmiris. (Similarly, Jammu Muslims are Punjabi and Gujjar Muslims, not Kashmiris.) Moreover, Jammu is only a shade smaller than Kashmir, both constituting nearly two halves of the J&K State. An ethnic notion of independent Kashmir cannot carry the entire state without being internally inconsistent, particularly if those groups, distrusting Kashmiri dominance, do not wish to join such a state.

All three notions on nationalism thus have run into serious contradictions. Built into the evolution of the Kashmir problem is a profound paradox. The unrest *within* Kashmir may not be religious in origins. Kashmiri nationalism may emerge entirely because of Delhi's undue interference in Kashmir. But unfortunately for Kashmiris, whatever the origins of their problems and complaints, their demands become inevitably *contextualized*. Outside Kashmir, the unrest is largely viewed through the available prisms of nationalism. Even if ethnic, Kashmiri unrest invites Pakistan's religious nationalism for Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state; it also provokes Hindu nationalism for it feeds into its basic article of faith, viz. Muslim disloyalty; and the two religious nationalisms put secular nationalism, the founding ideology of the Indian state, on the defensive. It is a context from which there has yet been no escape. *Kashmir has been and remains part of the Muslim Question on the subcontinent*. And the Muslim question is: where do they belong? This question led to India's partition. Embodied in Kashmir after the partition, it has led to

two wars since then. And that is the reason why neither India nor Pakistan would let go.

The Argument Elaborated

Religious Nationalism. Pakistan was born with the argument that Hindus and Muslims were not only two different religious communities, but also two separate nations. In 1940, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, provided the rationale for Pakistan:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality... They neither intermarry, nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions... They have different epics, (and) their heroes are different... Very often, the hero of one is the foe of the other and likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state... must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.¹²

For Pakistan, therefore, Kashmir continues to represent the unfinished business of partition. A Muslim-majority Kashmir, in Pakistan's view, should have been part of Pakistan. The trouble, as already indicated, is that in 1947, a number of Kashmiris themselves fought Pakistan vigorously. To Pakistan's further embarrassment, Bengalis in East Pakistan made a similar argument in the 1960s, and, with the help of India, broke away to form Bangladesh in 1971. Having thus suffered two blows to its Muslim identity, the possibility of Kashmir joining Pakistan cannot but restore pride. Pakistan supports a plebiscite in Kashmir, but not Kashmir's independence, even if that is what the Kashmiris want. It would offer only two alternatives to Kashmiris: either India or Pakistan.

Now, consider the alternative Muslim view. In a memorandum submitted to the United Nations as far back as 1951, two years after the cease-fire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir supervised by the United National Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), 14 distinguished Indian *Muslims*, calling attention to the plight of 40 million Muslims living at that time in India, made the following argument:

Pakistan has made our position weaker by driving out Hindus from Western Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us and our welfare. A similar process is in operation in Eastern Pakistan... If Hindus are not welcome in Pakistan, how can we, in all fairness, expect

Muslims to be welcomed in India. Such a policy must inevitably, as the past has already shown, result in the uprooting of Muslims in this country... It is a strange commentary on political beliefs that the Muslims of Pakistan who would like the Muslims of Kashmir to join them invaded the State, in October 1947... In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the 3 million Muslims from what it describes as the tyranny of a handful of Hindus in the (Jammu and Kashmir) State, Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40 million Muslims in India--a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare of fellow-Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realize that if Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India?...

Does Pakistan seriously think that it could give us any help if such an emergency arose...? It is incapable of providing room and livelihood to the 40 million Muslims of India, should they migrate to Pakistan. Yet its policy and action...may well produce (that) result.¹³

If this argument had not been made by Muslims, one would have guessed that it was a cleverly disguised contention of a Hindu nationalist. With some variation, much the same lines can be written today. The 40 million Muslims of India in 1951, number almost 110 million in 1991. Although it was only anticipated in 1951 by the Muslim intellectuals above, a Hindu nationalist upsurge is a political reality today. Moreover, those who left North India to become Pakistani citizens are called *Muhajirs* (refugees) in Pakistan. Arguing that they are discriminated against in the country they liberated, they have organized as a separate party in Pakistan. The cities of Karachi and Hyderabad (Sind) where most of them settled down have had a civil-war like situation for several years, with Muhajirs fighting the Pathans and also the native Sindhis with arms and ammunition. There is no place left for India's Muslims in Pakistan. In a very real sense, *Kashmir thus threatens to make 110 million Muslims politically and emotionally homeless*. It should not be surprising that Indian Muslims outside Kashmir have not supported the insurgency in Kashmir. Imam Bukhari, the highest religious leader of Muslims in India, has publicly stated that Kashmir is an integral part of India.¹⁴

To sum up, the contradiction of religious nationalism is as follows: If Pakistan "liberates" Kashmir from India, it runs the risk of seriously hurting 30 times as many Muslims as it "liberates"; if it does not try to "liberate" *rebelling* Kashmiris, it compromises the very founding principle of its existence. Since East Pakistan has already broken away, getting Kashmir back can only restore pride.

Secular Nationalism. The Indian National Congress (Congress hereafter), the party that led India's national movement, never accepted the two-nation theory. Hindus and Muslims had separate religions; they were not distinct nations. Paradoxically, the Hindu nationalists, if forced,

would really not have disagreed with the two-nation theory. Hindu nationalists did not object to Muslims living in India; rather, they had two scenarios. If Muslims wanted to live in India, they would have to recognize that India was primarily a Hindu civilization. If the latter was not possible, the two-nation theory was not a bad second-best for Hindu nationalists. Some Hindu nationalists were part of the Congress and several key figures, like Sardar Patel and Gobind Ballabh Pant, were even placed highly in the Congress organization. Consider Sardar Patel's fulminations when Pakistani invaders attacked Kashmir:

To Indian Muslims, I have only one question. Why did you not open your mouths on the Kashmir issue. Why did you not condemn the action of Pakistan?... It is your duty now to sail in the same boat and sink or swim together. I want to tell you very frankly that you can't ride two horses. Select one horse. Those who want to select Pakistan can go there and live in peace.¹⁵

The Hindu nationalists, however, could not subdue the secular ideology of the Congress. The mainstream of Congress remained in the hands of men such as Nehru and Gandhi¹⁶, who did not accept the two-nation theory, nor the argument that Muslims had to accept Hindu dominance.¹⁷

At the time of partition, Kashmir's refusal to go with Pakistan, despite a Muslim majority in the state, was undoubtedly a remarkable tribute to India's secular claims. Kashmir's leader Sheikh Abdullah argued unequivocally:

I and my organization never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We did not believe in the two-nation theory, not in communalism or communalism itself... We believed that religion had no place in politics.¹⁸

And later speaking to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly:

I will now invite you to evaluate the alternative of accession to Pakistan... The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favor is that Pakistan is a Muslim state and a big majority of our people being Muslims, the state should accede to Pakistan. This claim...is of course a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal state in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power. In addition to this, the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question... Right-thinking men would point out that Pakistan is not an organic unity of the Muslims in the subcontinent. It has, on the contrary, caused the dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistans at least a thousand miles apart from each

other. The total population of Western Pakistan which is contiguous to our state is hardly 25 million, while the total number of Muslim residents in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslims if they worried by such considerations should choose the forty million Muslims in India... Religious affinities do not and should not...determine the political alliances of states.¹⁹

Once Kashmir became part of India, however provisionally, it became inextricably tied up with India's secularism. Nehru argued:

We have always regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as it has far reaching consequences in India. Kashmir is symbolic as it illustrates that we are a secular state..., Kashmir has consequences both in India and Pakistan because if we disposed of Kashmir on the basis of the two-nation theory, obviously millions of people in India and millions in East Pakistan will be powerfully affected. Many of the wounds that had healed might open out again.²⁰

Nehru had in mind the wounds of partition, accompanied as it was by a quarter to a half million deaths and over 15 million migrations from either side of the border. This view proposing a link between Kashmir and Muslim welfare, dubbed as a "hostage theory" by Pakistani scholars and activists,²¹ did not go uncontested in India. Jai Prakash Narain, a critic of Nehru, pointed out the paradoxical implications:

What is meant by Kashmir being an example of Indian secularism? It means, I believe, that the people of India have given such proof of their non-communal outlook that the Muslims of Kashmir, even though they are in a majority there, have freely decided to live with India which is a Hindu-majority but secular country, rather than with Pakistan which is a Muslim-majority but an Islamic state. But suppose we had to keep the Muslims of Kashmir within India by force: would that also be an example of our secularism? The very question exposes its absurdity. Yet, how widespread is the mentality today that in order to defend the secular basis of our nation, we must keep Kashmir, if necessary by force, within the Indian Union.²²

Nehru's fears, however, were not imaginary. In 1952, Hindu nationalists led a popular movement in Jammu against Kashmir's vacillations on a full integration with India. But, more than ever before, the wounds have reopened in the late 1980s. Nurtured by the argument but more importantly by a widespread feeling among the Hindu middle classes that India's secular state has gone too far in appeasing minorities (in Punjab, in Kashmir, and Muslims in general), Hindu nationalism has gained remarkable strength in recent years. The attack on the mosque in Ayodhya in October 1990, despite thousands of pre-emptive arrests, was

the most conclusive demonstration of a deepening political trend that has already led to the most widespread Hindu-Muslim rioting since 1947. The turn of the decade, thus, demonstrates Kashmir's tragedy. Kashmiri nationalism may not entirely account for the rise of Hindu nationalism but, because of its history and context, it contributes substantially to it, and having done that, makes it difficult for the Indian state to deal with it generously. If Kashmir withdraws itself from the Indian Union and a second partition of India takes place, *the only beneficiaries will be Hindu nationalists.*²³

Being the only Muslim-majority state in India, Kashmir has been, and remains more so today, central to India's efforts to keep its secularism alive. Keeping Kashmir in India may have led to a tragedy; letting Kashmir go, however, means a tragedy of greater magnitude—a possible Hindu-Muslim bloodbath in North and East India. The prospect of nationwide violence that may ensue frightens India's secular politicians, intellectuals and a large section of India's middle class. *Not only is Kashmir a prisoner of the larger context. Even those wanting communal peace in India have become prisoners of Kashmir.* A dreadful but real symbiosis is in operation here.

*Kashmiri Nationalism.*²⁴ Caught between the two pulls and intensifying it to a great extent is the plight of Kashmiris. A complex of emotions has marked their relationship with the two countries. This complex is clearly dominated today by a desire for independence. Since Pakistan is an adversary of India, though not a supporter of Kashmir's independence, it is seen as a partial ally. Only the Islamic militant groups have an unqualified faith in Pakistan, not the secular militant groups. In 1947, however, India's help saved two-thirds of Kashmir from Pakistan's occupation. Pakistan was then unacceptable, but what should the relationship with India be? The issue was not primarily legal: the princely ruler had signed the treaty of accession with India in October 1947. The issue was political. The legality of accession had to be politically reaffirmed in a plebiscite. How should Kashmir define its identity—as an independent nation or as a part of India? A plebiscite was never held, because both India and Pakistan could not resolve their differences. Short of that, there is no good way of knowing what the Kashmiri masses felt at different points.

However, we do know a good deal about what the leaders said. From 1947 until his death in 1982, Sheikh Abdullah, the most notable of Kashmir's leaders, embodied in his person the ironies of Kashmir. He fluctuated between accession to India and independence. He explicitly rejected the two-nation theory. Even more important, Abdullah recognized the link between Kashmir's accession to India and India's secularism. While recommending ratification of accession to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah argued:

Certain tendencies have been asserting themselves in India which may in the future convert it into a religious state wherein the interests of Muslims will be jeopardised. This would happen if a communal organisation had a dominant hand in the Government, and Congress ideals of the equality of all communities were made to give way to religious intolerance. *The continued accession of Kashmir to India should, however, help in defeating this tendency.* From my experience of the last four years, it is my considered judgment that the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India has been the major factor in stabilising relations between the Hindus and Muslims of India.²⁵

Having seen this link, however, Abdullah later developed apprehensions and dithered. Should Hindu nationalists triumph in the struggle for power in Delhi, he asked, would Kashmir be secure in India?:

Many Kashmiris are apprehensive as to what will happen to them and their position if, for instance, something happens to Nehru. ...If there is a resurgence of communalism in India in India, how are we to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow up Kashmir...²⁶

Thus, despite an unwavering commitment to secularism, Abdullah, in the end, was not sure of the longevity of India's secularism. But this inevitably drove Abdullah into a corner. For the more he expressed reservations against India, the greater the chance he gave to Hindu nationalists to doubt his real motives, to charge him with duplicity, and to taint the entire Muslim masses in Kashmir with him. If Sheikh Abdullah loved India, if he was installed in power by Delhi, if he hated Pakistan, if his state was saved from Pakistan's occupation by India's timely intervention, and if India did not misuse its position in Kashmir's moment of distress by forcing a final decision, then where was the room, asked Hindu nationalists, for not accepting full accession with India?²⁷ What came in between? A basic Muslim disloyalty to India, suspected Hindu nationalists, though they could not explicitly argue so. In a post-partition context burdened with the memory of Hindu-Muslim clashes in North India, Abdullah, by his passionate embrace of India's founding principles, but a less than ardent acceptance of a union with India, made the position of his fellow ideologues in Delhi rather awkward. These ideologues were open to a charge of a starry-eyed, simple-minded idealism. Nehru, in particular, was vulnerable.

Ex-post, it is hard to see why Abdullah and secularists in Delhi were so afraid of Hindu nationalism. For it is clear in retrospect that, if anything, Hindu nationalism, after the fratricidal violence of 1947, declined in the 1950s. It is only in the 1980s that Hindu nationalism has risen to political visibility and strength. An *ex-post* perspective is, however, misleading, amounting to reading history backwards. Those

who participated in politics in the 1940s and saw the communal madness accompanying India's partition could not quite fully distance themselves from their political socialization. If we wish to reconstruct the universe of how leaders behaved, an *ex-ante* perspective would make greater sense, in which case the fact that Hindu nationalism declined in the 1950s is less important than the fact that political leaders were afraid it would rear up again. Precisely to fight Hindu nationalism, secularists like Nehru in Delhi needed Abdullah's unqualified support. In the end, a crippling paradox emerged. *Abdullah was not sure of the longevity of secularism; his unequivocal faith was, however, required for imparting longevity to secularism.* Kashmir has still not emerged from the deepening shadow of this paradox.²⁸

Uncertainty about the future of secularism is not the only way to explain Abdullah's vacillations. Another explanation, based more on calculation than uncertainty, also exists. It has often been argued that Abdullah was aiming at independence with the help of the British and Americans. Secularists often dismissed this proposition as a fantasy of the paranoid Hindu mind.²⁹ The de-classified documents of the U.S. State Department give credence to the Hindu nationalist claim. The clearest evidence comes from the telegram of Loy Henderson, U.S. Ambassador in Delhi, to the U.S. Secretary of State on September 29 1950:

While in Kashmir, I had two secret discussions with Sheikh Abdullah...at his request... He was vigorous in restating that in his opinion [Kashmir] should be independent; that overwhelming majority population desired this independence; and that he had reason to believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders...would be willing to cooperate... Kashmiri people could not understand why the U.N. consistently ignored independence as one of the possible solutions for Kashmir...

When I asked Abdullah if he thought Kashmir could remain a stable independent country without [the] friendly support [of] India and Pakistan, he replied negative. In his opinion Kashmir could exist only in case both these countries had friendly relations with each other; and in case U.S. through U.N.... would enable it, by investments or other economic assistance... There were so many areas of India in urgent need of economic development he was convinced Kashmir would get relatively little attention. Nevertheless, it would be preferable for Kashmir to go to India than to Pakistan. It would be disastrous for Kashmiris to be brought under control of (a) government with (a) medieval Koranic outlook.³⁰

Some earlier texts, dating back to 1948 and 1949, also indicate a preference for independence, though not so clearly.³¹ Abdullah's disapproval of Pakistan is consistent across his public pronouncements and secret confabulations with the U.S. A possible inconsistency lies in

the equivocaton between independence and integration. One interpretation would be that Abdullah was speaking the language of integration to Delhi and of independence to Washington--precisely the kind of duplicity that, according to Hindu nationalists, was mindlessly ignored by Nehru. These texts should, however, be read with care. Though generating serious doubts, they do not clearly establish duplicity. Did Abdullah dither on a full integration with India due to his hope that the Americans would support independence at some later date and therefore, for the moment, he had to position himself? Or, did he seek American help for independence because he was uncertain about Indian secularism? Is it likely that Abdullah did not wish to commit himself to India if it was going to be ruled by Hindu nationalists in the future, and had to seek outside support because independence was unviable without such support? Whether nor not research in the coming years can establish Abdullah's motivations, the fact remains that his moves, even if not entirely known, did not give room for comfort and certitude in Delhi. He continued to put the secularists on the defensive.

The Jammu Factor and Kashmiri Nationalism. The tripartite character of J&K (Table 1) exposed Abdullah's contradictions even more sharply. Of the three parts, Jammu was the region in question. Jammu had nearly 45 per cent of the state population. However, quite in contrast to the Kashmir Valley, where Muslims were 95 per cent of the population and Hindus a mere 5 per cent, the Hindus in Jammu were nearly two-thirds of the population, with the Muslims constituting roughly the other third. Abdullah had a solid popular base in the Valley, not in Jammu from where the Maharaja came, against whom his party had been agitating since 1931. Dogra Hindus in Jammu are ethnically different from Kashmiri Hindus in the Valley and the Maharaja came from a Dogra family.³²

When Sheikh Abdullah became the head of government upon the departure of the Maharaja, power shifted from Jammu to the Valley. Thus emerged the Jammu factor in Kashmir politics, a factor not fully recognized in discussions of Kashmir but one that complicated the issues in Kashmir immeasurably.³³

Jammu's political leaders had an unequivocal stand on the relationship with India: they wanted a full and unconditional integration. On a basic issue, then, the two large parts of the state, one only slightly bigger than the other, ran into a conflict. The other big issue concerned the weight of Jammu vis-a-vis Kashmir in the assembly, and in the cabinet. Abdullah wanted the entire state to have a separate identity and to be ruled by the Valley where a majority of the population lived. Jammu was opposed to both. Abdullah could not live without Jammu. It was a large part of the state; Srinagar in the Valley was the summer capital of the state, Jammu city in the plains its winter capital. And most of all, although Abdullah

Table 10.1

Population of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1981*

Region	Population (% of State Population)	% Muslims	% Hindus	% Others
Kashmir Valley	3,134,904 (52.36%)	94.96	4.59	0.05
Jammu	2,718,113 (45.39%)	29.60	66.25	4.15
Ladakh	134,372 (2.24%)	46.04	2.66	51.30**
TOTAL STATE	5,987,389 (100.00%)	64.19	32.24	3.57

*1991 Census figures are not yet available.

**Buddhist.

NOTE: The percentages for 1951 were different in only one significant respect. The number of Muslims in Ladakh was much lower in the late 1940s. No census was taken in 1951 due to the disturbed conditions in the state.

SOURCE: CENSUS 1981, Government of India.

might have been the head of government, Karan Singh, the head of state, came from Jammu and was the son of a Dogra maharaja. Karan Singh summed the problem thus: "the basic difference between ... Abdullah and me lay in the fact that while he looked upon himself as a Kashmiri who happened to find himself in India, I considered myself an Indian who happened to find himself in Kashmir."³⁴ The same could be said of Kashmir and Jammu respectively. In 1952, the contradiction became violent and led to Abdullah's arrest (Section II). Abdullah could not have Jammu and subject it to Kashmiri hegemony at the same time, while making an argument about Delhi not appreciating Kashmiri aspirations. This contradiction remains unresolved.

All three actors--India, Pakistan and Kashmir--have thus been unable to avoid the paradoxes and ironies inherent in practising their professed commitment. If India is committed to secularism and to democracy, why should it keep Kashmiri Muslims by force? If Pakistan is committed to Muslim nationalism, why should it not care about the consequences of its Kashmir policy for millions of Indian Muslims? If Kashmir's leaders have been committed to secularism, why have they vacillated on the issue of full accession to India, even after India (literally) protected Kashmiris from Pakistan's armed attempts in two wars (1947 and 1965)? And how can they keep Jammu and Ladakh if ethnic nationalism defines their aspirations?

Historical Evolution of the Kashmir Problem

Phase I: Fateful Origins in Ambiguity (1947-53)

The State of Jammu and Kashmir was not part of British India; rather, it was part of Princely India. Not directly governed by the British but by the hereditary rulers, the so-called Maharajas and Nawabs, the princely states were, nonetheless, under British "paramountcy", which essentially meant that for defence, foreign affairs and currency, they were subject to the British. There were nearly 600 such states, covering a large part of undivided India. When the British decided to leave in 1947, the princely states were advised by the British to opt for one of the two emerging independent states, called dominions at that time, though theoretically the option of independence was available. Princely states choosing independence would have essentially meant an awful Balkanization of the subcontinent.

In deciding which dominion to choose, India or Pakistan, two principles were recommended: geographical contiguity and the religion of the

majority community in the state. All but three princely states--Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu & Kashmir--decided to join India or Pakistan. From the perspective of religion, all three were marked by a ruler-ruled paradox. The religion of the princely ruler in each case was different from that of the majority of the population. Hyderabad and Junagadh had Muslim rulers but a Hindu majority. Moreover, both were not contiguous to Pakistan. India settled their accession by a combination of force and diplomacy.

The State of Jammu & Kashmir was more complicated than the other two. Sharing the ruler-ruled paradox, it had a Muslim majority but a Hindu ruler. It had three additional features, however. First, as already indicated, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, though Muslim majority, had three very different states merged into one--Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. The Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, did not come from the Kashmir Valley but from Jammu. Secondly, unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh, it was contiguous to Pakistan. In fact, the only year-long road link between Delhi and the Kashmir Valley went through Pakistan. Due to Winter snow, the mountain road that linked Delhi and Kashmir through India was closed for at least 2-3 months in a year.

Thirdly, a popular movement led by Sheikh Abdullah had developed against the autocratic rule of the Maharaja. It was a secular movement encompassing Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Though starting in 1931 as a Muslim Conference, by 1939 the party leading the movement had been renamed the National Conference. Religiously different, the Hindus and Muslims, argued Abdullah, "have a similar character, similar complexion, belong to a common race and even have similar names."³⁵ Because of its secular character, Abdullah's movement was ardently supported by the Congress, particularly by Gandhi and Nehru, and equally strongly opposed by the Muslim League under Jinnah's leadership. Abdullah later explained his differences with Jinnah: "Mr Jinnah wanted me again to transform the National Conference into the Muslim Conference--but I refused to do this. Generally, he felt that the right of accession lay with the ruler, not with the people of Kashmir. So...we disagreed on basic matters."³⁶

When the Maharaja did not join either India or Pakistan, tribesmen from Pakistan, with the support of Pakistan Army, invaded Kashmir in order to occupy it by force.³⁷ The Maharaja decided to ask the Indian Government to send its armed forces to help. The Government of India expressed its inability to help, unless the Maharaja decided to accede to India. India's armed forces could not legitimately defend a foreign territory against Pakistan at the time of partition. The Maharaja signed a treaty of accession with Delhi, accepted by the then British Governor General, Lord Mountbatten. When Indian forces landed in Kashmir, Pakistani invaders were only 10-15 miles away from the capital. India's

army pushed the invaders back. They were fully supported by the militia squads of the National Conference.³⁸ When the ceasefire was called between India and Pakistan in January 1949, the invaders, though beaten back, were still in control of one-third of Jammu and Kashmir.³⁹ The same cease-fire line, like the 38th parallel in Korea, holds today. The treaty of accession signed between the Maharaja and Delhi made India responsible for three things—defense, foreign affairs and communications. For the rest, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was autonomous. The treaty was incorporated in the Indian Constitution under Article 370, a subject of much political dispute later.

On the grounds that hereditary rule was no longer possible, the Maharaja was also persuaded by the Congress Party to hand over power to the leader of the popular movement against him. Sheikh Abdullah, thus, became head of Jammu and Kashmir government. Moreover, as already explained, Prime Minister Nehru offered that Kashmir's accession to India would be submitted to a popular referendum later. Though based on a liberal principle, Nehru's decision to submit the decision to a plebiscite was also, at least partly, a reflection of the confidence he had in a Kashmiri vote for India. National Conference, after all, believed in the same principle of secularism and was the only popular political organization in Kashmir. Moreover, Abdullah had explicitly rejected integration with Pakistan. Abdullah even wanted the Indian Army to stay: "Once we ask the Indian Army, which is the only protective force against the marauders, to clear out, we leave the country open to chaos".⁴⁰

The promise of plebiscite, however, would soon begin to haunt India. The objective circumstances changed significantly in a matter of four years. A welter of realpolitik engulfed the promise of plebiscite. Both India and Abdullah ended up seriously compromising themselves. Some of the problems were international, others internal.

Internationalization of the Kashmir Problem

Given that internationalization of the Kashmir problem eventually brought problems for India, it is, in retrospect, ironical that India took the lead in bringing the Kashmir issue to the United Nations on December 31, 1947. Nehru's purpose was to get the Security Council's censure for "Pakistan Government's personnel, civil and military, participating in or assisting the invasion".⁴¹ To begin with, Pakistan denied official involvement, arguing that the tribals, driven by their feelings for their Muslim brethren, had undertaken the invasion themselves. Referring to the Hindu-Muslim violence in the border towns of Jammu, Pakistan argued that India was carrying out a genocide against the Muslims, that India wanted to undo the partition, that it had secured the accession of Kashmir by fraud and suggested that, since a pro-India government existed in Kashmir, a

plebiscite in Kashmir should take place under U.N. supervision.⁴² Representing Kashmir, Abdullah called Pakistan an aggressor in the Security Council, arguing that "it is absolutely impossible for the tribesmen to enter our territory without encouragement of Pakistan", and that "hundreds of trucks, thousands of gallons of petrol, thousands of rifles, ammunition and all forms of help that an army requires were supplied to them".⁴³

India obtained Kashmir's support but not that of Britain and the United States. In its initial debates, the Security Council not only did not call Pakistan an aggressor, but declared Kashmir a disputed territory, thereby supporting the Pakistani position. A plebiscite, to be held later under the U.N. auspices, would decide Kashmir's fate. The principle of plebiscite was not a contradiction of India's position, but the U.N. argument for why a plebiscite was necessary went against India. What was a legal accession according to the Indian constitution (only to be politically ratified) was made into an Indo-Pakistan dispute by the U.N. According to the Indian and Kashmiri governments, Pakistan had no *locus standi* in Kashmir; it was simply an aggressor. Because Pakistan was treated as an equal party to the dispute, Nehru's irritation with the British and American position was obvious.⁴⁴

A U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was appointed to carry out the U.N. mandate in Kashmir. It arrived in the subcontinent in July 1948. During its research, it found evidence of Pakistan's involvement in the invasion. It reported to the U.N. on August 13, 1948 that "the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was last represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council".⁴⁵ Before a plebiscite could be conducted, a two-part prior action, according to the UNCIP, was necessary. In the *first* part, Pakistan should withdraw its forces from the disputed territory, "secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state solely for the purpose of fighting".⁴⁶ In the *second* part, "when the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals...have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces..., Government of India [will] begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that state in stages agreed upon with the Commission."⁴⁷ Once both withdrawals were completed, a plebiscite would be held.

The UNCIP, thus, endorsed India's case. It was only a partial endorsement, however, because, even after Pakistan's involvement was established, the state continued to be called a disputed territory between Indian and Pakistan. To be sure, both Delhi and Abdullah had declared

that a plebiscite had been pledged independently, but the pledge had nothing to do with Pakistan.

The August 13, 1948 UNCIP Resolution remained the bedrock of the United Nation's position on Kashmir for the next three decades. However, both India and Pakistan did not withdraw their forces, India claiming that, according to the U.N., Pakistan had to pull back first, and Pakistan contending that there was no guarantee India would withdraw its forces.

The Internal Complexity

Meanwhile, by 1951-52, the tripartite character of the State of Jammu and Kashmir made the situation within the state explosive. In November 1951, Jammu and Kashmir's Constituent Assembly was elected. Most of the National Conference politicians were elected unopposed. Election papers of politicians opposed to the National Conference were found either technically faulty, or the opposition parties boycotted the election. Meanwhile, as head of the Jammu and Kashmir government, Abdullah had announced a radical land reform program that would dispossess the landlords without compensation. The purpose of the Constituent Assembly was, inter alia, to debate and politically settle the question of accession to India, ratify the land reform program, delimit the functions and tenure of the Royal Dynasty of the Maharaja, and devise a constitution for the governance of the state.

To Abdullah's lack of political base in Jammu, four specific sources of discontent were added between 1950-52. First, his five-member Cabinet had only one representative from Jammu, even though Jammu had nearly 45 per cent of the state population. Moreover, in the Constituent Assembly, Jammu had only 29 out of 75 seats whereas the Valley had 44 seats.⁴⁸ Second, the annulment of election papers of the opposition candidates, even if technically sound, was viewed as illegitimate. Third, the land reforms program, even if intended by Abdullah to be entirely socio-economic, was viewed in communal terms. The reason simply was that most landlords in Kashmir were Hindus and most peasants Muslim.⁴⁹ Fourth, suspicions about Abdullah's intentions were deepened by the emerging reports that in his dealings with the Western powers, he had expressed preference for Jammu and Kashmir as a sovereign independent state, not as a state fully acceded to India.⁵⁰ Though at that time a suspicion, the now declassified papers of the U.S. Department of State containing despatches of Loy Henderson, America's Ambassador in India, support this claim.⁵¹

By mid-1952, a popular movement against Abdullah, led by a Hindu regional party, the Praja Parishad, emerged in Jammu. It was also joined by the Jan Sangh, the leading Hindu nationalist party in Delhi. S.P.

Mookerjee, a parliamentarian of repute in Delhi and President of the Jan Sangh, took personal interest in the Parishad agitation, and argued on its behalf in Delhi.⁵² Afraid that Jammu would forcibly come under Kashmiri domination, the Parishad argued for a full and irrevocable integration of the entire state with India. Limited accession was not acceptable. The Parishad questioned Sheikh Abdullah's motives by pointing to "inconsistencies" in his logic: if Sheikh Abdullah hated the Two-Nation theory, and his principles were the same as those of the Indian polity, then where was the ground for not accepting a full accession? Where was the need for a state constitution as distinct from a national constitution?⁵³ Why should Sheikh Abdullah retain the title of Prime Minister from the royal dynasty—if he had fought the Princely system and already unseated the Maharaja, if other heads of state governments all over India were called Chief Ministers, and if the title of Prime Minister was reserved only for the head of national government in Delhi?⁵⁴ What was the rationale for continuing to have a separate state flag (as in the princely times) instead of a national flag that all other Indian states had?⁵⁵ Why should an Article 370 exist, giving the state a special status, even though other princely states had acceded fully without any constitutionally sanctioned special provisions? Indeed, was not Abdullah's argument about limited accession tantamount to saying that there were three nations in India—Hindus, Muslims and Kashmiris?⁵⁶ The mobilization was conducted on a highly symbolic and emotional issue: *Ek Pradhan, Ek Nishan and Ek Vidhan* (One Prime Minister, One Flag and One Constitution).

The complexity required a quick resolution in black and white; but Abdullah kept dealing in greys. The more irritated he became with the demand for a black-and-white resolution in Jammu, the greater the doubts about the ultimate truth of Abdullah. Conversely, the more the Praja Parishad intensified its agitation, the more strident Abdullah's position became on accession to India. The Parishad agitation, said Abdullah, "literally poured cold water on the efforts of the National Conference to rally Muslim support for India all these years."⁵⁷

Matters came to a head with the detention of S.P. Mookerjee and his death in a Kashmir jail. Defying the J&K Government's ban on his entry to the state, Mookerjee forcibly entered the state and was arrested. Mookerjee died in detention. The circumstances of his death still remain unclear. Whatever the truth, fingers of accusation were pointed at Abdullah. Unrest in Jammu and West Bengal (Mookerjee's home state) and bitter debates in Delhi followed. Abdullah claimed that the fury against him was conclusive evidence of a deepening Hindu chauvinism in India.

Nehru's stance also hardened. Nehru and Mookerjee were political adversaries, yet as the outcry against Nehru's faith in an apparently

unreliable and dithering Abdullah increased, the message of Mookerjee's death was clear to Nehru. He could not continue to build his Kashmir policy around Abdullah. "Nothing more harmful to our causes in the State could have been done even by our enemies. It is for me an almost personal tragedy".⁵⁸ Nehru's subsequent pleas to Abdullah imploring him to show a firmer commitment to India--so that his Kashmir policy could be saved--have a ring of irony and despair:

To me it has been a major surprise that a settlement arrived at between us should be bypassed or repudiated, regardless of the merits. That strikes at the root of all confidence, personal or international... My honor is bound up with my word... It is always painful to part company after long years of comradeship, but if our conscience so tells us...then there is no help for it. Even so we must do it with full understanding and full explanation to each other...⁵⁹

Abdullah did not respond. Soon thereafter, matters slipped beyond the control of both Nehru and Abdullah. Though claiming to represent Kashmir fully and viewed as such by Nehru and secularists, dissent against Abdullah in his party and Cabinet was brewing. His position on India was eventually disowned by 3 out of 4 members of his cabinet (Abdullah was the fifth member). The dissenters wanted a fuller integration with India, which essentially meant support for the Parishad's stand too.⁶⁰ Abdullah refused to resign, claiming that the people of Kashmir were with him, a claim that could not have been established in the chaos of July-August 1953 even if it was correct. Karan Singh ordered Abdullah's arrest.⁶¹ Abdullah remained in prison with few exceptions till 1968.⁶² It was a remarkable twist of fate. In a matter of six years, Nehru's longtime friend and Delhi's trusted lieutenant in Kashmir, a Muslim who attacked the very founding principles of Pakistan in the United Nations, and supported India's secularism had to languish in Indian jails.⁶³ New Delhi's embarrassment could not have been deeper.

Phase II: Imprisoned Ethnic Nationalism, Emasculated Religious Nationalism and the Triumph of Secular Nationalism (1953-83)

Sheikh Abdullah's arrest removed the most powerful exponent of Kashmiri nationalism from the political scene.⁶⁴ His successor, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, though a leading member of the National Conference, was an advocate of a complete union with India. New Delhi and Srinagar resumed a normal relationship at the governmental level, and to soothe any possible sense of injury in the Valley, the Government of India started pouring in developmental funds that would build roads, hospitals, schools and bring electricity to the Valley. Constitutional developments got under way independently. Over time, a combination of internal and

external developments began to freeze the existing division of Kashmir. A third of Jammu and Kashmir, under Pakistan's control at the time of ceasefire, was brought increasingly under Pakistan's political control, whereas the Indian side of Kashmir went through a similar logic under Indian tutelage.

Externally, the absorption of the subcontinent into the Cold War was the most significant development. In effect, it made the UNCIP resolution irrelevant. In 1954-55, on grounds that Pakistan was on the periphery of the Soviet Union, the U.S. offered a security alliance to Pakistan. Pakistan accepted the deal, despite India's protests that the arms supplied by the U.S. would be used against India, not against the Soviet Union for whom Pakistan was hardly a match. Rather than pulling out its troops from Kashmir, which the U.N. recommended, Pakistan, argued Nehru, would actually bolster its battered armed forces in Kashmir. The Soviet Union seized the opportunity. Abstaining earlier from the Kashmir debates in the Security Council, it began supporting India's stand at international forums. Being a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union could veto any U.N. resolution passed against India. On the other hand, receiving U.S. support, Pakistan also did not have to pull out of Kashmir. The Security Council became irrelevant to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem. Rather than a decision-making body, the United Nations simply became a debating body. A plebiscite did not take place, for its prior conditions could not, and would not, be met.

Internally, with Abdullah gone from the scene, the J&K Constituent Assembly approved a merger with India in early 1956.⁶⁵ On March 29, 1956, Nehru, in a famous speech in the Indian parliament, withdrew the offer of plebiscite on three grounds: (a) that for a plebiscite to take place under the U.N. terms, Pakistan had to first withdraw its forces from "occupied Kashmir," called "Azad (independent) Kashmir" by Pakistan; (b) that Kashmir's Constituent Assembly had approved the merger with India and accepted India's constitution; and (c) that the drawing of the subcontinent into the Cold War's security alliances had changed the objective situation drastically, for it reflected Pakistan's desire to seek military solutions--something intolerable and a sign of bad faith, according to Nehru.⁶⁶

Nehru was right about the first and third points, but the second point represented a change in his position. To show his liberal credentials, Nehru in the early 1950s had rejected Abdullah's proposal that the Constituent Assembly be taken as representing popular wishes and its decision on the relationship with India be deemed a legitimate substitute. Fortified by Soviet support in the Security Council and provided a reason by Pakistan's security alliance with the U.S., Nehru's nationalism edged out his liberalism.

Nehru's third point about Pakistan's military intentions towards Kashmir turned out to be prophetic after his death in 1964.⁶⁷ Persuaded by the British and Americans to resume negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir,⁶⁸ he did briefly try diplomatic solutions prior to his death. He secured the release of Abdullah from jail⁶⁹ and asked him to go to Pakistan to talk to President Ayub Khan.⁷⁰ By then, however, too much acrimony and distrust surrounded Sheikh Abdullah. Moreover, India had just been mauled and humiliated in the battlefield by China. Thinking India was weaker than ever before, Pakistan was in no mood to compromise.⁷¹ In any event, no breakthroughs were made. In May 1964, Nehru died, Abdullah was arrested a year later on suspicion of anti-India activities⁷² and, upon Pakistan's confident moves in Kashmir in the autumn of 1965, a second Indo-Pakistan War broke out.

Strategically, the War was an inconclusive draw. But politically, it was a grave miscalculation on Pakistan's part. After nearly 15 years, when India had been on the defensive at international forums, the situation changed. Considerable animosity was observed against Pakistan in Kashmir, even by independent observers, and its use of American weapons against India created problems in its relationship with the U.S. Apparently, Pakistan's calculation was that with Pakistan's support, Kashmiris would rise in revolt against India, something that India's armed forces, battered in the war against China only 3 years back, would not be able to quell. For this reason, several hundred—by some calculations, nearly 7000—armymen and para-military personnel in civilian guise were sent into the Valley to generate an uprising.⁷³ In fact, however, the uprising did not come about, a war nonetheless took place as India and, most significantly, Pakistan's "infiltrators" in the Valley were turned in by Kashmiri Muslims in substantial numbers. Pakistan contended that the people captured by India were not Pakistani "infiltrators" but Kashmiri freedom fighters openly in revolt against India.

Independent observers could get no evidence of it. *The New York Times* found that "most of the prisoners captured thus far do not speak the Kashmiri dialect. They speak...Punjabi and other dialects." Thus, the so-called freedom fighters were actually men from Pakistan's Punjab. *The Washington Post* remarked: "The Moslem Pakistanis, led by President Ayub, had expected the infiltrators to be able to produce a general uprising and this is Ayub's first disappointment."⁷⁴ Other Western Correspondents—from *The Times* (London), *The Baltimore Sun* and the B.B.C.—concurred independently.⁷⁵ Once again, it seemed clear that whatever the state of their relationship with India, Kashmiris did not wish to embrace Pakistan.⁷⁶

A Kashmiri uprising along with an India-Pakistan War would indeed have put India's armed forces, only marginally stronger after the battering suffered at the hands of the Chinese, to a severe, perhaps an impossible

test. Speaking purely strategically, if the 1989 Kashmiri uprising had taken place in 1965, Pakistan's military chances in Kashmir would have been remarkably strong. India's armed forces could deal with Pakistan's military in 1965 but would have been terribly stretched if both an invasion and an uprising had taken place simultaneously.

Another war erupted six years later. The bone of contention was East Pakistan, not Kashmir, but it had serious consequences for Kashmir. Pakistan was bifurcated, East Pakistanis claiming that they were *Bengali* Muslims, not simply Muslims, decimating thereby the Two-Nation theory based on the religious priority over ethnicity. Moreover, the war was a severe blow for Pakistan's armed forces. Both ideologically and militarily, it was a catastrophe for Pakistan.

It was an awful moment for Kashmiri nationalists also. They might have opposed Pakistan but since they had a troubled relationship with India, often seeking a divorce from what they viewed as a forced marriage, they ended up getting an ally in Pakistan. For Pakistan, the best case scenario was Kashmir's accession. Kashmir's rupture from India, whatever it meant for Pakistan, was a second best, better than the worst case scenario of Kashmir's integration with India.

The 1971 catastrophe for Pakistan thus weakened Kashmiri nationalists. A plea for divorce had to be turned into a compromise. Aware of these implications, Sheikh Abdullah finally made his peace with India. "Our dispute with the Government of India", he told *The Times* (London) in an interview, "is not about accession but it is about the quantum of autonomy."⁷⁷ This was the first public admission of a change in his position, something the Indian government was willing to deal with as it could be easily accommodated in a federal framework. Moreover, the statement led to no serious protest in the Valley.

India's Golden Moment in Kashmir (1977-82). On its part, Delhi proceeded at two levels, external and internal. After its defeat, Pakistan had to come to a peace agreement with India. For India, it was also an opportunity to extract concessions on Kashmir. In the event, on July 2 1972, an agreement was signed by Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, known as Simla Accord, proposed: "In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line."⁷⁸

Having thus received a commitment from Pakistan that it will not use force in Kashmir, and agreeing that the two countries should meet again for "a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir", Delhi moved internally by reopening negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah signed an agreement with Delhi in February 1975, accepting that Kashmir was "a

constituent unit of the Union of India" and that "no law made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, seeking to make any change in...the constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir...shall take effect unless the Bill...receives (President of India's) assent." Moreover, Indian Parliament would "continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty of India...or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution."⁷⁹ In return, Article 370 was kept alive, which gave, as originally intended in 1950, more autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir than to any other state in India on "welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, personal law and procedural laws in a manner suited to the special conditions of the state."⁸⁰ Also, the Congress Chief minister, Syed Mir Qasim, was asked to resign. Sheikh Abdullah succeeded him. Abdullah's compromise did not lead to any significant protest in the Valley. The Jamaat-i-Islami, a party that has always argued for Kashmir's integration with Pakistan on religious grounds, organized a small demonstration that did not go very far.⁸¹

Abdullah's leadership was later electorally legitimated. Elections in 1977 demonstrated overwhelming support for him. It is unanimously believed that the 1977 elections were the first fair elections in the state, the earlier three elections having been rigged by the ruling coalition. Abdullah ruled until his death in 1982. Kashmir was quiet—and beautiful as ever. It seemed as though the problem had been solved. From the perspective of New Delhi, it was a golden phase. Both the rulers in Kashmir and the populace seemed content. A marriage had been made.⁸² Ironically, nothing symbolized the marriage better than the Sheikh's funeral procession. The dead body draped in Indian flag was carried twelve kilometers from the Polo grounds in Srinagar to the burial ground near the Hazratbal mosque. Observers of the funeral heard a familiar chant: "*Sher-e-Kashmir ka kya irshad? Hindu, Muslim, Sikh Ittehad*" ("What was the message of the Lion of Kashmir? Friendship between Hindu, Muslim and Sikhs"). It was the slogan of the late 1940s, when the Sheikh's partymen and Indian forces fought the tribal invaders. "Sheikh Abdullah had died an Indian," comments M.J. Akbar, former newspaper editor, a Member of Parliament in the 9th Lok Sabha and a friend of the Abdullah family. Akbar was present at the funeral. "The Government of Pakistan", noted the journalist Akbar, "had no comment to offer on the death of Sheikh Abdullah".⁸³

Phase III: Abusive Secular Nationalism, Islamic Resurgence and a Rekindling of Kashmiri Nationalism (1983-1991)

Sheikh Abdullah was succeeded by his son, Farooq Abdullah (Farooq hereafter). A year later in 1983, Farooq won the state election and emerged a leader in his own right. The National Conference under his leadership won handsomely, beating the Congress party in the state. Mrs. Gandhi herself campaigned for Congress against the National Conference. Expressing her sympathy with the Hindus of Jammu who, according to her, lived in a Muslim-majority state, she gave the first signs of using blatantly communal messages in search of votes, a trend that was to deepen later in Congress' electoral politics. This was also the time of Mrs. Gandhi's, by now well-documented, centralizing political drive.⁸⁴ Mrs. Gandhi sought to undermine several state governments ruled by non-Congress parties. Newspapers continued to report how, to install Congress governments, defections were being encouraged. Like other non-Congress Chief Ministers, Farooq and Mrs. Gandhi were set on a collision course.

The non-Congress parties began to come together, and Farooq became part of the emerging "Opposition Conclave". Faced with opposition unity, Mrs. Gandhi used defections and her control over gubernatorial appointments to dislodge duly elected state governments run by opposition parties.⁸⁵ The Andhra Pradesh government run by a regional party was sacked by the Governor of the state. Similarly, J&K was given a governor known to be close to Mrs. Gandhi. One of his first gubernatorial acts was to dismiss the Farooq government on the ground that it had lost majority support in the assembly. Governor Jagmohan did not give the Chief Minister a chance to test his majority in the lower house, which was the standard procedure. Farooq was simply given a list of candidates who, according to the Governor, had defected from his party.⁸⁶

In an awkward display of power, New Delhi thus violated the federal principle and had a pliant Chief Minister imposed on Kashmir. Farooq received considerable grassroots support, but that was not enough to undo Delhi and its allies in the state. Most observers agree that Farooq's dismissal was the beginning of a new phase of alienation in the Valley. Old fears were revived.

These fears could have been channelized within a federal framework if Farooq had continued to fight on a principle with the support of other opposition parties. However, in a surprising *volte face* and defying the basic logic of Kashmiri politics, in 1986, after Mrs. Gandhi's death, Farooq ended up signing a deal with Congress. Congress under Rajiv Gandhi and the National Conference under Farooq Abdullah undertook to contest the 1987 state elections together and to form the government if they won. When a similar proposal was made by Congress for the 1983 elections,

Farooq had "discussed the matter with senior colleagues...[it] became clear to us that if we agreed to an alliance with the Congress, the National Conference would...gradually be wiped out."⁸⁷ These words would turn out to be prophetic. Farooq now admits that it was a horrible mistake.⁸⁸

In the elections that followed in 1987, *Kashmiriat* was mobilized by a coalition of Islamic groups, known as the Muslim United Front (MUF). This development was as unexpected as Farooq's alliance with Congress. In Kashmir, the orthodox Islamic parties had been electorally insignificant. The Jamaat-i-Islami had won a mere 5 seats in the 1972 state elections, only 1 in 1978 and none whatsoever in 1983, the election that launched Farooq as a symbol of Kashmiri aspirations. Of these, the 1978 and 1983 elections are widely viewed as the two fair elections in the state. Absorbing several practices from Hinduism and Buddhism, Kashmiri Islam is well-known for its syncretism. Now, support for an orthodox Islamic political platform was growing.

In yet another act of miscalculation, the National Conference, after two clean elections, returned to its old methods. Watching a surge in MUF support, the Conference-Congress alliance rigged the elections. With the benefit of hindsight, one can say that support for the MUF, while considerable and surprising in a land of quietistic Islam, would not have been enough to oust Abdullah.⁸⁹ Less popular than before, his support base was still not wiped out. In a Valley where no party except the National Conference had any hold, emergence of a party capable of getting even a plurality of vote, let alone a majority, alarmed the Conference-Congress alliance. Not only was the vote rigged, reports indicate that several electoral candidates of the MUF were beaten up. Some of those candidates crossed the ever-porous Indo-Pak border and joined the extremist groups.⁹⁰ The leadership of the insurgency two years later would come from some of these contestants.⁹¹

Later that year, riots against Farooq's Government broke out, Muslim fundamentalists burned the Indian flag and called Farooq a traitor to the Kashmiri cause. As more people got killed in the riots, the anti-Farooq sentiment intensified. Farooq and the Congress managed to get a huge majority, but they ruled without legitimacy. The sanctity of the electoral process and Kashmiri trust in Farooq, already declining after the agreement with Congress, collapsed after these elections.

This was also the time of Pakistan's military revival. Ruled by a military-led government, the Afghanistan crisis restored a frayed Pakistan-U.S. relationship. Always the beneficiary of American arms, Pakistan's military shook off the effects of its 1971 debacle. More importantly, unlike President Ayub Khan who was a modernist military leader, President Zia ul-Haq, the new leader, began a process of Islamization in Pakistan. As trouble in Kashmir brewed, Kashmiri nationalism once again found an ally in Pakistan. By 1987, two kinds of Kashmiri militant groups had started

operating from Pakistan--Islamic groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen and the more secular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The Hizbul Mujahideen, a fighting wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami, want Kashmir to join Pakistan on grounds of religion. The JKLF wants an independent Kashmir on grounds of ethnicity.

Pakistan's political support for *all* militant groups is undeniable. It is widely believed, however, that Islamic groups have received greater support from Pakistan. The Pakistan Government accepts that it provides political support to the militants but denies supplying arms.⁹² Many believe, including the U.S. Government, that Pakistan has also provided armed support to the militants. There is no good way for a researcher to confirm this widely held belief, supported by reporters every now and then.⁹³ Thanks to the war in Afghanistan, weapons of deadly potential are so easily available that the Pakistan Government does not have to supply weapons in order for the militants to get them. A veritable arms bazaar exists in Pakistan. Armed to the hilt, Kashmiri militants have not only taken on India's paramilitary forces with Kalashnikovs and grenades, they have also engaged Indian Army convoys in pitched battles for 8-10 hours.⁹⁴ Weapons meant for war have reached the hands of insurgents.

What a researcher can confirm, however, is that Islamic militants are even today not the most popular group in the Valley. The Hizbul Mujahideen may be organizationally the strongest, but the JKLF, a secular militant group, is by far the most popular. Its support is open and explicit, whereas the support for the Hizbul Mujahideen is confined to pockets and, more often than not, is not openly expressed.⁹⁵

Dimensions of a Tragedy. India's response has been more brutal than ever before. The government's efforts to roll back the insurgency and the militants' armed resolve to "liberate" Kashmir have produced daily deaths. Of these, Hindu deaths are between 150 to 300, prey to the bullets of Islamic militants. The Muslims constitute a majority of those killed, primarily by India's armed forces but also by armed militants silencing dissenters in their own community. The number of Hindus killed would have been greater, if most of them had not migrated to camps in Jammu and in Delhi. Some left after losing kith and kin to Islamic militants, others after receiving death threats,⁹⁶ but most left in utter panic between January and March 1990--simply to preempt death. Of the more than 150,000 Hindus (5 per cent of the population), only a few thousand Hindus are left in the Valley.

So unusual are these events and so shaken are the Kashmiris, both Hindus and Muslims, that we have to first look for appropriate language and metaphors to describe the situation. Burdened with rational concepts and disembodied language, a typical social science exercise cannot capture the real dimensions of the Kashmir tragedy. It is necessary to understand

the nature of the pain being experienced, partly because no solution of the Kashmir situation will last if the emotional truths are ignored. People will make a compromise but not *any* compromise. The Congress-Conference alliance, whatever its rationality, foundered on the rock of mistrust and betrayal.

As a general rule, human beings both think *and* feel. There are moments, however, when feelings completely dominate rational thinking. If a man loses his only child, or if his much loved wife is killed, the emotional pain renders rational thinking impossible, at least for some time. A whole community has felt that way in Kashmir. Militants, intellectuals and politicians might be thinking strategically, but an average citizen knows only one truth, the felt truth, the emotional truth.⁹⁷

There are two stories to tell, one from the Valley, the other from the migrant camps.⁹⁸ Both tales are marked by a deep sense of loss, bitterness, and a virtually complete lack of trust in government. The difference, however, is that Kashmiri Muslims feel *mutilated and defiled* by the security forces; the Hindu migrants feel *uprooted and betrayed* by the government, though clearly several have also been defiled by the Hizbul Mujahideen, the leading Islamic militant group. To Kashmiri Muslims, the security forces are the ugly face of "India". To Jammu migrants, the Hizbul Mujahideen are the despicable face of Islam. Between the two agonies--mutilation and defilement in the Valley, and displacement and betrayal in the camps--the tolerant religious middle as well as the moderate secular center have collapsed. Sober or rational thinking lies buried under unceasing emotions, tears and anger on both sides.

The implications for a solution are that the mutilation in the Valley will not go away unless the paramilitary forces are withdrawn, and the displacement of the Hindus will not abate unless the Hizbul Mujahideen lose their strength. The JKLF, committed to an independent but secular Kashmir, is willing to take the Hindus back. JKLF may be the most popular organization, but the Hizb continue to be a substantial presence and they are opposed to the return of Hindus.⁹⁹

Conclusion

The logic of Kashmiri politics can be culled from the discussion above. Kashmir has not been a problem when (i) its leaders have acted autonomously without going to the point of secession, (ii) when the search for autonomy has not been crushed by Delhi but accommodated in a federal framework, and (iii) when Pakistan has been militarily weak. At this point, should it try, New Delhi can, in principle, have control over the second element only. A stalemate, therefore, continues.

How long will the current stalemate last? Two factors militate against the militants' cause. First, beyond Pakistan, Kashmiri militants have little governmental support. In a dramatic change, the U.S. Government in the current phase has supported India's position that a resolution of the Kashmir problem should be sought within the bilateral framework of the Simla Agreement of 1973. The second factor is domestic. Unlike Punjab where insurgency does not destroy economic activity in the villages where most Punjabis live, Kashmir is a one-crop, one-season economy. Tourism is the lifeblood of Kashmir's economy; and the countryside, in addition, is dependent on horticultural exports of apples and peaches. Both activities are essentially conducted in the summer, stretching a little bit into the fall. A civil war kills tourism, and since banks and transport are essential to the export of fruits but are closed due to the insurgency, it also takes away the main source of rural incomes. Another summer or two without tourists and exports is likely to bring grave economic misery.

Since the moderate center has collapsed and the militant groups are popular, no solution is possible without the militants. When asked how long they will support the militants in view of the economic implications, Kashmiris resent the question in group settings but admit to a possible economic catastrophe in private. Militants, of course, say they would fight until the very end. It is unlikely, however, that the militants can provide a substitute for these activities. In all probability, mass support for the militants will decline in such a situation. At that point, two things can happen. Fearful of losing support, there may be a greater willingness on the part of militants to compromise. If not, an even bigger tragedy awaits Kashmir, given that India will not give up its claims for all the reasons outlined above.

Can militants agree to negotiate a solution with India? Without an understanding between India and Pakistan, it is unclear why the militants would come to the table. Pakistan may not be strong enough--militarily or diplomatically--to force a solution on India, but nor is it so weak that it would *have to* cease supporting the militants out of fear. So long as Pakistan's support is available, the militants--or at least some militant groups--can continue to operate with or without popular support within the Valley. An agreement between India and Pakistan thus is a necessary condition for the solution of the problem. To believe, as Hindu nationalists do, that a full assertion of state authority is all that is needed to defeat the militants¹⁰⁰ is to be both insensitive to Kashmiri agony and to be far from realistic. At the very least, militants committed to Kashmir's integration with Pakistan will not negotiate with New Delhi, even if the independence-minded militants do. And if the latter agree to negotiate, they face the possibility of extinction in an internecine warfare. So long as arms continue to come to the Islamic groups and Pakistan supports them, no agreement will stick. The agreement in Punjab with the

moderates collapsed due to the exclusion of the hardliners, who ultimately killed the moderate architect of the agreement.

In order for Kashmir to have peace, India and Pakistan need to compromise. The shape of compromise cannot be predicted. But the lack of a compromise will only prolong the tale of sorrow—to the misfortune of Kashmiris and to the sadness of outsiders looking for meeting points in these parallel acts of defiance and brutality. Midnight's children must begin to grow up. Will their leaders become statesmen?

Notes

1. Research in an area of insurgency cannot be conducted without the generous and often touching support of activists, political leaders, journalists and officials. It is neither possible nor desirable to identify them to acknowledge one's debt—primarily because of the contrasting sensitivities and emotions involved. A special word of gratitude does go out, however, to Kashmiri people who shared their emotions and thoughts in countless conversations. I have benefitted from presentations of this argument at Brown University, at the Harvard-MIT-Boston University Faculty Seminar on South Asia, and at the South Asia Seminar, Harvard Center for International Affairs. For comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to H.E. Chehabi, Ashok Jaitley, T.N. Madan, Leo Rose, Judith Shklar and Sunder Viswalingam. Nisha Kumar provided admirable research assistance. Field research in India was funded by Harvard University. [A shorter version of this paper appears in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 11, November 1991. This version is being printed with the permission of The Regents of the University of California, publishers of *Asian Survey*.]

2. Among the first to deal with this possibility were: Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition*, University of Chicago, 1967; Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", *Comparative Studies in Societies and History*, April 1967; and Rajni Kothari, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited", *Government and Opposition*, Summer 1968. Building upon the existing monographs and displaying a comparative and historical sweep, the most widely noted attack on the presumed march of modernity came from Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics", *Comparative Politics*, April 1971. In the 1970s, scholars began to make the argument that rather than eroding ascriptive identities, modernization, if its unevenness was not matched by neutralizing political institutions, might actually intensify ascriptive antagonisms. For example, see Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*, Princeton University Press, 1978.

3. One should, of course, add that even the West is not untouched by ethnic or religious assertion. Northern Ireland continues to burn, the Basque question in Spain remains unresolved, the Quebec question flared up again in Canada last summer, and in France, anti-immigrant right-wing politics has been able to attract a sizeable proportion of the vote.

4. In his critique of modernization theory and explanation of why modernization could be replaced by a rising ethnicity, Huntington, for example, had argued that "modernization destroys the more intimate communities in which alone man can realize his full personality; it sacrifices human, personal and spiritual values to achieve mass production." ("Change to Change", p. 298)

5. The most notable example is Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1990. See also the thoughtful review by Martin Hollis, "Why Elster is Stuck and Needs to Recover His Faith", *London Review of Books*, January 24, 1991.

6. The significant works are: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso Press, 1983; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, 1983; Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, 1986; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, 1986; Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

7. *The Economist*, "The AK's Cash Kill", January 19, 1991, p.36.

8. Pakistan denied involvement to begin with. It was, however, discovered later by the United Nations. See below. For evidence from a Pakistani scholar, see Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 56-60.

9. Parenthesis added. Speech given to the Security Council, February 5, 1948.

10. From Nehru's poetic description of the Kashmir valley, written after his visit in 1945: "Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley and lake and graceful trees. And then another aspect of this magic beauty would come to view, a masculine one, of hard mountains and precipices, and snow-capped peaks and glaciers, and cruel and fierce torrents rushing down to the valleys below. It had a hundred faces and innumerable aspects, ever-changing, sometimes smiling, sometimes sad and full of sorrow. ...The clouds would throw out their arms to embrace a mountain-top, or creep down stealthily like children at play... As I gazed at it, it seemed to me dream-like and unreal, like the hopes and desires that fill us and so seldom find fulfillment. ..." (*An Autobiography*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.)

11. Democratic theory recognizes this point. See, for example, Dankawrt Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", *Comparative Politics*, April 1970, pp. 350-1.

12. This is the famous Jinnah speech which formed the intellectual bedrock for Pakistan. It was given on March 23, 1940 in Lahore and has been reproduced in several documents. See Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore: Ashraf, 1952, Vol. I. p. 138.

13. This memorandum was submitted to Dr. Frank Graham, UN Representative in Kashmir, on August 14, 1951. The signatories included Dr. Zakir Husain (then Vice Chancellor, Aligarh University; later President of India), Sir Sultan Ahmed (Former member of Governor General's Executive Council), Sir M.A.S. Khan (former Acting Governor of United Provinces and Prime Minister of the princely state of Hyderabad), Sir Mohammed Usman (Vice Chancellor, Madras University), Sir Iqbal Ahmed (Former Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court) and nine other respected and highly placed Muslims.

14. *India Today*, July 31, 1990. The only Muslim political leader of some standing to have disagreed with this position is Syed Shahabuddin. Cf. *Muslim India*, June 1990.

15. An unpublished letter cited in a recent essay written by Rajmohan Gandhi, "Patel, Nehru and the Mahatma" *Indian Express Sunday Magazine*, January 20, 1991. Rajmohan Gandhi, being a grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, has access to some as yet undisclosed correspondence between Gandhi, Nehru and Patel. These lines were, of course, written before the Muslim memorandum to the UN.

16. Nehru, of course, denied religion a place in politics. Mahatma Gandhi's view, however, was more complicated. Unlike Nehru who was religious neither in private nor in public, Gandhi was both. Yet, he did not share the animosity felt by the Hindu nationalists towards the Muslims. He simply argued that religion could not be the basis of nationalism and, as was characteristic of his personalized political style, alluded to the case of his son who had embraced Islam. "My eldest son embraced Islam a few years back. What would his homeland be -- Porbandar (where he was born) or Punjab (where the idea of Pakistan was formed)? I ask the Muslims: if India (is) not your homeland, what other country do you belong to? In what separate homeland would you put my son who embraced Islam?" Speech given to the Congress session in Bombay, August 1942, cited in M.J. Akbar, *The Siege Within*, New York: Viking Penguin, 1985, p. 20.

17. Nehru's view is best expressed in the following statement: "It is an impossible argument. If we admit it, then, within India today after partition, there are 40 million Muslims. Are they Pakistani citizens and do they owe allegiance to Pakistan? Every village in India has Muslims. There are Christians. Is there Christian nationality or Muslim nationality or Buddhist nationality, a Hindu nationality?" Cf. S. Gopal, *Nehru: An Anthology*, op. cit., p. 224.

18. Speech to the Security Council, February 6, 1948.

19. Speech delivered on November 5, 1951.

20. Speech in Parliament, September 17, 1953. The same view was expressed in an interview he gave to his biographer, Michael Brecher:

Michael Brecher: "Well, aside from the fact that Kashmir has legally acceded to India, what makes Kashmir so important to India? Does it have any implications for India's efforts to establish a secular state and to maintain communal harmony in this country."

Jawaharlal Nehru: "Yes, that is probably the most important aspect of it.... When Kashmir joined India, both in a constitutional sense through the Maharaja ...and in a popular sense through the organization....(I)t was very important for us because it helped our thesis of nationalism not being related to religion. If the contrary thesis were proved...it would have a powerful effect on the communal elements in India, both Hindu and Muslim. That is of extreme importance to us--that we don't, by taking some wrong steps in Kashmir, create these terribly disruptive tendencies within India." Cf. S. Gopal, *Nehru: An Anthology*, Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 217.

21. Ayesha Jalal, "Kashmir Scars", *The New Republic*, July 23, 1990. The "hostage theory" does not pay attention to the liberal paradox, constituted by an antithesis between liberalism and nationalism and especially applicable when the nation is still being constructed.

22. Jayaprakash Narayan, "The Need to Re-Think", *The Hindustan Times*, May 15, 1964.

23. At this point, thus, India's secular state is being attacked from two sides--by Hindu nationalists and by Kashmiri militants (and Sikh extremists in Punjab). The Hindu nationalists argue that the state has gone too far in appeasing minorities--to the point that secessionary demands have been openly made, as in Kashmir (and Punjab). The militants argue that the Indian state basically represents the interests of the majority community: the religious and ethnic minorities are prey to the tyranny of the majority.

24. For want of a more precise term, "Kashmiri nationalism" is being used here to analyze the feelings and politics of Muslims in the valley. Muslims in Jammu and "Azad Kashmir" are also called Kashmiris. My arguments apply to valley Muslims, where the Indo-Pak battle has been the most intense.

25. Opening Address to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, November 5, 1951.

26. Speech in Ranbirsinghpura on April 10, 1952. Cf., *Khidmat*, Sri Nagar, April 13, 1952.

27. Best illustrated in the remarkable 1952-53 correspondence between Sheikh Abdullah, Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Nehru, *Integrate Kashmir: Mookerjee, Nehru & Abdullah Correspondence*, Lucknow: Bharat Press, undated.

28. If one were to use game theory, this situation would have the structure of an Assurance Game. Abdullah was unsure what would happen in Delhi; leadership in Delhi was unsure what Abdullah's strategy was going to be. Both deeply wanted a secular dispensation, but without a guarantee that a secular future would obtain, they lost each other's trust. And a suboptimal outcome--an unresolved Kashmir problem--resulted.

29. A prominent example is M.J. Akbar, *The Siege Within*, op. cit.

30. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (Department of State, Washington D.C., 1978), Vol. 5, pp. 1433-1435.

31. *Ibid.* Ambassadorial communication to Washington on 21 February and March 1, 1948, pp. 292, 303-304.

32. Similarly, the Muslims in Jammu are culturally different from the Valley Muslims, who, like the Hindus in Jammu, are more Punjabi than Kashmiri. Abdullah was not popular among the Jammu Muslims either. Another political organization, the Muslim Conference, represented Jammu Muslims. The leaders of this organization migrated to the Pakistani side of Kashmir upon the partition of India.

33. The two best accounts of the Jammu factor are: Balraj Puri, *Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1981; and Karan Singh, *Autobiography (1931-1967)*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989. The autobiography was initially published in two parts: as *Heir Apparent* (1982), and as *Sadar-i-Riyasat* (1985). The 1989 edition merged the two volumes into one. Karan Singh, son of Maharaja Hari Singh, succeeded his father as the titular head of state in 1949 and remained in that position till 1967. Also see Balraj Puri's Article "Jammu and Kashmir" in Myron Weiner, ed., *State Politics in India*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968.

34. Karan Singh, *Autobiography*, op. cit., p. 121.

35. *The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah*, Dehra Dun and Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1974, p. 42. Abdullah's great grandfather was a Hindu. M.J.Akbar, a family friend tells us, that the Abdullahs were Hindu Brahmins until 1776, when the conversion to Islam took place (*The Siege Within*, op. cit., p. 223).

36. *The Testament*, *Ibid*, p. 75.

37. For evidence on Pakistan's involvement, Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 56-60.

38. The main slogan of the militia illustrated the approach of Abdullah and his followers: "*Sher-i-Kashmir ka kya irshad? Hindu Muslim Sikh Itihad* (What is the teaching of the Lion of Kashmir? Unity among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs)."

39. Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, the head of the 161 Brigade that pushed the tribals and Pakistan Army back, claims that if the political bosses had not called for a ceasefire, the Indian Army would have re-captured the remaining one-third territory also. For details of the 1947-48 Indo-Pakistan War by a soldier, see his *Slender Was the Thread, Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48*, Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1969. For an account from the Pakistan side, see A.H. Suhrawardy, 1983, Lahore: Wajidalis Limited. Suhrawardy was a civil servant for more than 25 years on the Pakistan side of Kashmir after 1948.

40. Abdullah in the U.N. Security Council, February 6, 1948, op. cit., p. 208.

41. Security Council Documents, S/628, Indian complaint, January 2, 1948.

42. Sir Zafarullah Khan's reply on behalf of Pakistan, U.N Documents, S/PV 228-229, January 16-17, 1948, pp. 36-96.

43. See endnote number 9.

44. S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1947-56*, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979. Chapter on "Kashmir and Hyderabad", pp. 26-42.

45. U.N C.I.P. Resolutions, S/1430, December 1949 (texts of the August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 resolutions). The January 5 resolution maintained a similar position regarding Pakistan troops.

46. *Ibid*.

47. *Ibid*.

48. Girdhari Lal Dogra was the only Minister from Jammu. The other three Ministers, all from the valley, were Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Sham Lal Saraf and Mirza Afzal Beg. Similar complaints were heard in Ladakh. Though they had 2 seats in a 75 member Constituent assembly, which was higher than their percentage in the population (2.2%), Buddhist politicians, particularly Kushak Bakula, an important Ladakhi leader, resented Kashmiri domination.

49. Sheikh Abdullah later reminisced: "Our plan affected Hindu and Muslim *zamindars* (landlords) equally but..... our measures were then labelled as anti-Hindu... (T)his was a most unfortunate development" (*Sheikh Abdullah's Testament*, op. cit, p. 37).

50. Cf. Karan Singh, *Autobiography*, 1989 edition, *ibid.*, pp. 121.

51. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, op. cit.

52. A good deal of the debate between the country's eminent political leaders took place in an epistolary form at the time. It has been published as a document: *Integrate Kashmir: The Mookerjee-Nehru-Abdullah Correspondence*, Lucknow: Bharat Press, undated.

53. "If India's constitution is good enough for the rest of India, why should it not be acceptable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir?" Cf. S.P. Mookerjee, letter to Nehru, *Integrate Kashmir*, p. 24.

54. "You call yourself...the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. There can and should be (only) one Prime Minister and he is the Prime Minister of India as a whole. In all other states, the first executive citizen is known as Chief Minister...." Cf. S.P. Mookerjee's letter to Sheikh Abdullah, *Integrate Kashmir*, op.cit, p. 77.

55. "...(I)f each state starts having its own flag, according to the wishes of the party in power, then it will be a blow to India's national and political unity. And that is what you have sought to have done." Cf. Mookerjee to Abdullah, *ibid*.

56. "There can not be a republic within a republic... Consciously or unconsciously, you are creating a new sovereignty for Jammu and Kashmir... India has been torn into two by the two-nation theory. You are now developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiri nation. These are dangerous symptoms..." Cf. Mookerjee to Abdullah, *ibid*, p. 77.

57. From Sheikh Abdullah's undelivered speech, drafted by him for the Id congregation scheduled for August 21, 1953 in Srinagar. The speech could not be delivered because Abdullah was arrested on August 9 (see below). The draft was released by Abdullah's attorney, Mridula Sarabhai, in 1956.

58. Cf. S. Gopal, *Nehru*, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 130.

59. Nehru's letter to Abdullah, June 28, 1953, in S. Gopal, *Nehru*, Vol 2, op. cit., pp. 130-1.

60. The dissenters wrote: "After convening of the Constituent Assembly, certain inescapable elaborations of the state's relationship were defined in the Delhi Agreement, of which you were the Chief architect on our behalf. Your stand was unanimously endorsed by the Government, the National Conference, the Indian Parliament and the Constituent Assembly of the State....(Y)ou have not only deliberately delayed the implementation of the Agreement...which form the sheet-anchor of our policy, but have purposefully and openly denounced these in public. You have thus arbitrarily sought to precipitate a rupture in the relationship of the State with India....Mr. M.A. Beg has persistently been following policies of narrow sectarianism and communalism, which have seriously undermined the oneness of the State. Unfortunately, you have been lending your support to his policies in the Cabinet and his activities in public....We have been constantly urging upon you to put an end to these unhealthy tendencies...It is...with great pain that we have to inform you of our conclusion that the Cabinet, constituted as it is at present..., has lost the confidence of the people...." Memorandum sent to Sheikh Abdullah by Deputy Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Finance Minister G.L. Dogra, Health Minister S.L. Saraf on August 8, 1953, copied to Karan Singh, cited in Singh's *Autobiography*, op. cit., p. 159.

61. The order to imprison Abdullah was given by Karan Singh, Maharaja's son and successor. For the drama surrounding the decision, see Karan Singh, *Autobiography*, op. cit., pp.158-164. Nehru was aware that the arrest was imminent. "For the last three months, I have seen this coming, creeping up as some kind of inevitable disaster." Cf. S. Gopal, *Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

62. In a political career lasting over 50 years, Abdullah was jailed 9 times, 6 times by the Maharaja of Kashmir before the partition of India and 3 times after that. After his imprisonment in August 1953, Abdullah was released four and a half years later in January 1958, to be imprisoned again by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed on April 29, 1958. After nearly six years in jail, Nehru secured his release in April 18, 1964. Arrested a third time on May 8, 1965 upon his return from Algiers where he met Zhou En-Lai, he was released in January 1968. As the Indo-Pak hostilities over Bangladesh seemed imminent, he was debarred from entering Kashmir on January 8 1971, but was free to be anywhere else in India. Upon India's victory in the war, he was allowed to return to Kashmir on June 5 1972.

63. Abdullah's incarceration was also a personal tragedy for Nehru. Abdullah was a friend. In 1947-48, both Nehru and Abdullah unambiguously valued their friendship. "It is said that Sheikh Abdullah is a friend of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Yes, I admit that. I feel honored that such a great man claims me as his friend". These were the words of Abdullah in the Security Council in 1948. *Op. cit.* p. 204. Nehru was equally warm: "The only person who can deliver the goods in Kashmir is Abdullah. I have a high opinion of his integrity and his general balance of mind. He may make any number of mistakes in minor matters, but I think he is likely to be right in regard to major decisions. No satisfactory way can be found in Kashmir except through him." Nehru to the Maharaja of Kashmir, November 13, 1947, as cited in S. Gopal, *Nehru: A Biography*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 117. The Hindu nationalists never tired of blaming Nehru for such excessive and misplaced reliance on one man.

64. Abdullah's supporters formed a Plebiscite Front after his imprisonment. Their political efforts, however, could not pose a serious challenge to Bakshi. Demonstration launched to protest Abdullah's arrest could not generate a popular uprising either. Clearly, Abdullah was central to political mobilization in the valley. His imprisonment, it may be noted, was celebrated in Jammu. So divided the state was by then.

65. Pakistan raised the issue in the United Nations. Paradoxically, Pakistan's argument in 1956 was that the Constituent Assembly was hardly representative without Sheikh Abdullah. Earlier considered a traitor, Abdullah was now an ally. The Cold War context, however, made any progress in the U.N. impossible.

66. Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament), 29 March 1956, also published also as a pamphlet "*Kashmir Mein Lokmat Nahin*" (i.e., No Plebiscite in Kashmir), Srinagar: Lala Rukh Publications, undated. In a resolution passed on December 2 1957, the Security Council commented that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly could not overrule the U.N. Resolution, and that the resolution of January 5 1949, that asked Pakistan and India to withdraw from their respective parts--in that order--was still effective. For perhaps the only time, the Soviet Union abstained from the December 2 1957 resolution, ostensibly to convey its displeasure on India's critique of Soviet Union's 1956 intervention in Hungary. In general, the UN stalemate continued. Supported by the U.S. and Britain, Pakistan would not move out of "Azad Kashmir", and supported by the Soviets, India would not leave the Valley, while (correctly) maintaining at the same time that Pakistan had to leave first under the U.N. resolution of January

1949. For Nehru's reaction to the December 1957 resolution, see S. Gopal, *Nehru*, Vol. 3, *op. cit.*, pp.42-52.

67. Even earlier, as the United States was assuring India that its arms to Pakistan would not be used against India, Cabinet Ministers of Pakistan, in particular Noon and Suhrawardy, stated publicly that Pakistan had joined SEATO and CENTO to strengthen itself against India. For details, M.S. Venkatramani, *The American Role in Pakistan*, Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982, particularly pp. 335-340.

68. S. Gopal, *Nehru*, Vol. 3, p. 255-6.

69. A case, known as the Kashmir Conspiracy Case, had been filed against Abdullah by the Kashmir Government and the Investigations Department of the Government of India in 1957. Nehru prevailed upon Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, head of the Kashmir Government, to withdraw the case, arguing that "if a damn thing can't be proved in four years, in six years, there is obviously nothing to be proved." Cf. Y.D. Gundevia, *Outside the Archives*, Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1984.

70. In the last 2-3 years of his life, Nehru experimented with the idea of a Confederation as a solution to the Kashmir problem. It would lead the way, he thought, to an eventual Indo-Pakistan Confederation. For details, see Y.D. Gundevia, *Outside the Archives*, *op. cit.* Abdullah conveyed this idea to President Ayub, who "vehemently denounced" the proposal, for it "would encourage the forces of disintegration, not only in Pakistan but more so in India" (in Y.D. Gundevia, *Sheikh Abdullah's Testament*, *op. cit.*, p. 82). Interestingly, Gandhian Socialists, opposed to Nehru for having ideologically betrayed Gandhi in independent India, have continued to argue that an Indo-Pakistan (and now, an Indo-Pakistan-Bangladesh) Confederation is the only longterm solution to the political and military rivalry in the subcontinent. In his speech at Harvard on October 12 1990 (published elsewhere in this volume), George Fernandes, a Gandhian Socialist and Cabinet Minister for Kashmir Affairs in the V.P. Singh Government, reiterated this idea.

71. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of Pakistan's team on Kashmir, is reported to have remarked: "You are a defeated nation, don't you see?" Cited in Y.D. Gundevia, *Outside the Archives*, p. 246.

72. Abdullah was released on April 8 1964, a month and a half before Nehru's death. After his visit to Pakistan, which did not lead to any breakthroughs, Abdullah left India for a *haj* pilgrimage. During this trip, he went to Britain, Egypt and Algeria. While in Algiers, he managed a secret meeting with Zhou En-Lai, the then Premier of China, a state that had only recently militarily trounced India. Even if his intentions were not anti-Indian, Abdullah's meeting with Zhou, inevitably, led to a political storm in India and only furthered doubts about his politics. Upon his return to India, he was arrested.

73. For an account of Pakistan's plan from a Pakistani General involved in the war, Mohammed Musa, *My Version*, Lahore: Wajidalis Limited, 1983. General Musa had not recommended infiltration in Kashmir, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. His objections were, however, overruled by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Defense Secretary, and ultimately by President Ayub Khan. Also see, Inder Malhotra, "25 Years After the '65 War'", *The Times of India*, November 6, 1990.

74. Chalmer Roberts in *the Washington Post*, September 27, 1965.

75. *The Times*, August 31, 1956; *The Baltimore Sun*, August 23, 1965. Even "political circles hostile to Indian Kashmir Government agree", reported James Keat of the *Baltimore Sun*, "that there is no uprising of the local residents."

76. Jai Prakash Narayan, the eminent Gandhian leader, had been a critic of Nehru's Kashmir policy after Abdullah's imprisonment in 1953 and particularly after his second incarceration in 1957. Along with C. Rajgopalachari, Narayan had been working towards a tripartite solution of the Kashmir problem, primarily in a confederal framework. After the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Narayan dropped his insistence on a role for Pakistan.

77. Interview given to correspondent Peter Hazelhurst, *The Times*, March 10 1972.

78. From the text of Simla Accord released by both Governments on July 2, 1975.

79. From the text of Kashmir Accord, signed in November 13 1974 and announced in Parliament on February 25 1975.

80. *Ibid.*

81. A Jamaat activist explained the difficulty to me: "We always disagreed with Sheikh Saheb but it was hard to quibble with him in 1975. Despite differences, one doesn't quibble with a man who had spent most of his political life in jail while fighting for his people." Interview conducted in Hindi-Urdu in July 1990. Anonymity necessary for security reasons.

82. A speculation would be in order at this point. In retrospect, Delhi missed a golden opportunity during the Sheikh's rule. With his support behind India at long last, New Delhi would, in all probability, have won a plebiscite in Kashmir. It is easy to be wise after the event, however. No one foresaw a return of the Kashmir problem.

83. M.J. Akbar's *The Siege Within*, op. cit., p. 275.

84. Myron Weiner, *The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics*, New Delhi and Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989, Chapter 3, pp. 77-98; and Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, Chapter 4, pp. 127-147.

85. India's parliamentary system is replicated at the state level. A Governor, appointed by Delhi, is the constitutional head of the state and Chief Minister, head of the party elected to rule in state elections, is the head of government.

86. Governor Jagmohan denies any wrong-doing. He was simply acting in interest. According to him, Farooq's Government was soft on pro-Pakistan elements, and did nothing to deter Sikh secessionists in Punjab from using Kashmir. Several legislators had openly revolted against Farooq's leadership. Interview with Mr. Jagmohan, Delhi, August 4 1990. The trouble with Mr. Jagmohan's view is not that he is not a nationalist. No one doubts that, not even his detractors. Rather, this is precisely the kind of *Indian* nationalism that generates *Kashmiri* nationalism, for it rides so roughshod over Kashmiri self-respect. Violation of the federal principle for the sake of India does not help Indian unity, it undermines it.

87. Farooq Abdullah, *My Dismissal*, Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985, p. 21.

88. Farooq Abdullah, Interview with author, Delhi, August 10, 1990. Farooq gave two reasons for the alliance. He wanted to end the apparently interminable rivalry between the National Conference and Congress. And secondly, "My parameters were like this. Delhi is vital for us; in development Delhi is vital; ...for the survival of Kashmir, Delhi is vital. So I said alright, come and join me. What is our fight? Our fight is to remove economic backwardness..to improve the state's future".

89. MUF only won 4 out of 70 seats, whereas the National Conference won 36 and the Congress 24 (mostly in Jammu). MUF claimed it could have won 38 seats and thus formed the government. This claim seems excessive. The margin of the Conference victory had clearly narrowed. Abdullah himself polled 78.7 per cent votes in his constituency instead of 95.8 percent in 1983, his opponent getting 18 per cent votes instead of 3 per cent in 1983. Cf. *The Times of India*, March 27, 1987. For a fuller analysis of the 1987 elections, see Nisha Kumar, "Separatism and Secular Democracy: Evolution of Insurgency in Kashmir", Honors Thesis, Government Department, Harvard University, March 1991.

90. One should add that the option of seeking a redress through an alliance with civil rights groups that have begun to monitor elections in India and have successfully fought against the most abrasive cases of rigging in recent years was available but not chosen by the MUF leaders. It seemed too ineffective to them.

91. Conversations with journalists, intellectuals and activists in the Valley are enough to convince the researcher that many MUF leaders who contested the 1987 elections participated in the insurgency. Some have become Area Commanders of the various militant groups. Their names are widely known but for reasons of safety, they cannot be revealed here. Incidentally, Farooq Abdullah accepts that some beatings may have taken place but adds that he had no control over what the party cadres were doing. He believes, however, that beatings are exaggerated and rigging, though wrong, did not make a critical difference to the outcome. He "watched the situation helplessly after that". Interview, Farooq Abdullah, op. cit.

92. Interview with Shafgat Kakakhel, Minister-Counsellor, Pakistan High Commission, New Delhi, August 13 1990.

93. Sheila Teft, "Pakistan Keeps Firm Control of Young Kashmiri Militants", *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1990.

94. Cf. George Fernandes, Minister for Kashmir Affairs in the V.P. Singh Government, in a talk at the South Asia Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, October 12, 1989.

95. Field impressions, Kashmir Valley, and interviews with Hindu migrants in Jammu. Jammu migrants, incidentally, have a vested interest in attributing the insurgency to Islam. Probed deeply, they accept that the JKLF is the most popular body in the Valley.

96. I saw letters from the Islamic militants, asking Hindu writers to stop writing in Hindi, "a language of infidels", failing which they would be killed.

97. Based on the writer's visit to the valley and to Hindu migrant camps in Jammu in July 1990. The two best accounts in Indian press are by Harinder Baweja, "Shadows of Death", *India Today (Delhi)*, July 31, 1990, and a pictorial

essay by Raghubir Singh, "Kashmir Then and Now", *Sunday* (Calcutta), July 8-14, 1990.

98. Unfortunately, the Western media almost exclusively reported the pain of the Kashmir valley. The most consistent one-sided reporter has been Barbara Crossette of the *New York Times*. The Hindu migrants in Jammu are still (literally) waiting for her to record their stories. The most balanced articles appeared in the *Christian Science Monitor* and in the *Financial Times*.

99. Interview given by one of the Area Commanders of Hizbul Mujahidden to *Observer News Channel* (Delhi), December 1990.

100. Kedar Nath Sahni, interview, Delhi, August 12, 1990. Sahni is a General Secretary of the BJP and the party's Kashmir spokesman.

11

The Politics of Azad Kashmir

Leo E. Rose

Leo E. Rose is the Editor of *Asian Survey* and Adjunct Professor (now retired) of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He first conducted research on the northwestern section of the subcontinent in the late 1950s in the context of the emerging Sino-Indian dispute over the Ladakh area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He was in Kashmir at the time of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and conducted a major research project on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War in which Kashmir was one of the principal conflict zones. He has been working on a project on Kashmir's internal politics since the mid-1980s, conducting research programs in Srinagar (1986 and 1987), and in Azad Kashmir (1989). Some of his publications on this area are: *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, War and Secession: India, Pakistan and Creation of Bangladesh, Beyond Afghanistan: The Emerging U.S.-Pakistan Relations*, and the international relations chapters in the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka*. Leo Rose was a Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena (1976-77) and also served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in the U.S. State Department (1984-85).